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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for national security
69 results foundAuthor: Robinson, Neil Title: Security, At What Cost? Quantifying People's Trade-Offs Across Liberty, Privacy and Security Summary: To understand the real privacy, liberty, and security trade-offs individuals are willing to make, and so policy makers can be beter informed about citizen's true preferences in this domain, this study surveyed British citizens on the issues of privacy and security for three activities: applying for a passport, traveling on the national rail network, and attending a major public event such as the opening ceremony of the Olympics. Data from the survey was analysed and individuals were found to be willing to pay for advanced CCTV cameras with facial recognition technology, X-Ray machines and body scanners and various forms of security personnel. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 99p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118730 Keywords: Crime PreventionNational SecurityPrivacySecurity |
Author: Chalk, Peter Title: The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment Summary: Terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia. For much of the Cold War, the activities of a variety of domestic ethnonationalist and religious militant groups posed a significant challenge to the region's internal stability. Since the 1990s, however, the residual challenge posed by substate militant extremism has risen in reaction to both the force of modernization pursued by many Southeast Asian governments and the political influence of radical Islam. Building on prior RAND research analyzing the underlying motives, drivers, and capabilities of the principal extremist groups that have resorted to terrorist violence in the Philippines, southern Thailand, and Indonesia, this study examined the historical roots of militancy in these countries to provide context for assessing the degree to which local agendas are either being subsumed within a broader ideological framework or shaped by other extremist movements. Moving beyond simple terrorism analysis, this research also examined national and international government responses to militant movements in the region, including counterterrorist initiatives, military and policing strategies, hearts-and-minds campaigns, and funding and support from international organizations and governments (including the United States). Finally, the study broke new ground in assessing Cambodia as a potential future terrorist operational and logistical hub in Southeast Asia. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 238p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG846.pdf Shelf Number: 115178 Keywords: National SecurityTerrorism, Southeast AsiaTerrorists |
Author: Bergen, Peter Title: Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group Summary: Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated. Indeed, these jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2010 at: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 119828 Keywords: National SecurityTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: National Research Council. Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security. Title: Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences Summary: The intelligence community (IC) plays an essential role in the national security of the United States. Decision makers rely on IC analyses and predictions to reduce uncertainty and to provide warnings about everything from international diplomatic relations to overseas conflicts. In today's complex and rapidly changing world, it is more important than ever that analytic products be accurate and timely. Recognizing that need, the IC has been actively seeking ways to improve its performance and expand its capabilities. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to synthesize and assess evidence from the behavioral and social sciences relevant to analytic methods and their potential application for the U.S. intelligence community. In Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the NRC offers the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recommendations to address many of the IC's challenges. Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow asserts that one of the most important things that the IC can learn from the behavioral and social sciences is how to characterize and evaluate its analytic assumptions, methods, technologies, and management practices. Behavioral and social scientific knowledge can help the IC to understand and improve all phases of the analytic cycle: how to recruit, select, train, and motivate analysts; how to master and deploy the most suitable analytic methods; how to organize the day-to-day work of analysts, as individuals and teams; and how to communicate with its customers. The report makes five broad recommendations which offer practical ways to apply the behavioral and social sciences, which will bring the IC substantial immediate and longer-term benefits with modest costs and minimal disruption. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2011 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13040#description Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13040#description Shelf Number: 121093 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringNational SecurityRisk Assessment |
Author: Bayer, Michael D. Title: The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence Summary: A fundamental doctrine of the United States is the system of checks and balances, a system wherein political power is dispersed among various governmental elements so that no particular interests or segments can dominate the government — or the people. One of the most strident criticisms of the former Bush-Cheney administration has been that in the time of crisis and immediately after, and in the years following the 9/11 terror attacks, executive (presidential) authority had been greatly expanded during the strategic response to those attacks and was, according to some, abused — thereby skewing our revered system of checks and balances. Certain segments of governments are acknowledged to be tools of political power — particularly subject to political influences. In the United States the military is exceptionally susceptible to the political designs of the President and the administration because he is their direct-line Commander in Chief. It is also widely acknowledged that intelligence services are part of the political epicenter of governments, because they too are a vitally important direct-line tool of national leadership. As it happened, these are the two segments of our government that benefited most, in terms of power, mission, and funding, from the prosecution of the United States’ Global War on Terrorism. In fact, it had been asserted by former Vice President Cheney on U.S. national television (FOX) that the war on terrorism was an effort to be waged by the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence services and not law enforcement. This book maps out how bureaucratic maneuvering in the aftermath of 9/11 led to the U.S. military/intelligence apparatus assuming primacy and garnering near exclusivity in the international aspect of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This ultimately resulted in the fundamental exclusion of some of the most powerful components of the vast international resources at the fingertips of U.S. law enforcement. The book argues that allowing this to happen was a big mistake — and an unnecessary one at that. The existing networks of international law enforcement are powerful in their own right, but globalization and concomitant worldwide reconfiguration of national sovereignty have greatly empowered inter-governmental networks (such as those of international law enforcement). This book asserts that law enforcement is especially conducive to the advantages aff orded to international networks because the “culture of the badge” provides an immediate basis of trust and commonality to build upon — a commonality that can transcend borders, politics, religion, ethnicity, and other categories of segregation. Furthermore, some international policing scholarship asserts that law enforcement entities seek their own autonomy away from centers of political power by striving to find better, more effi cient ways to serve the state and the public (corruption influences notwithstanding) and in so doing are given the leeway to do so. One way they do this is by engaging in informal means of doing business — seeking one-on-one interaction with foreign counterparts rather than going through multiple layers of bureaucracy and government. Those who work in international law enforcement understand implicitly and explicitly that using informal networks is how most international police business is accomplished — especially in this day and age of e-mail and cell phones. But it is not the power of the network alone that brings value added to transnational policing. It is the sheer volume of numbers of police that are dispersed throughout nearly every nation in the world — and who live and work at all levels of societies, from the back alleys and villages from where terrorism breeds to the wealthiest levels, from where political/religious terrorism is financed. It is the numbers of police combined with their mandates to gather and acquire information — whether for investigative or public security purposes. Police have always had a vested interest in gathering and tracking information about local troublemakers and criminal activity in order to maintain public order and, as such, are a natural resource of acquiring terrorism information — particularly in regard to cells which might be financing or otherwise supporting operations through criminal activity. It is the ability to conduct their business among multiple levels of societies and within populations at large which makes international law enforcement very likely the largest and most potent counterterrorism network on the face of the earth. Hence, the title of this work — The Blue Planet. The worldwide network of police is a formidable asset — made even more formidable by the investigative and arrest authorities bestowed upon U.S. law enforcement and its foreign counterparts. This book will demonstrate that the willful disregard of such a spectacularly valuable asset was not only foolhardy, but also served to deny the American public the measure of national security they would have been entitled had the process been honestly brokered and strategically considered. Instead, in spite of the best of intentions, the parochial interests of the most powerful agencies prevailed at the expense of our own citizens. Police can and do cooperate with one another internationally to combat transnational crime. Organizations such as Interpol and Europol exist for this purpose — but those organizations, while valuable, bring with them the burdens and inefficiencies of their own diplomatic formalities, rules, regulations, and procedures along with the accompanying bureaucracies of participating member governments. Informal policing has been around for even longer than formal arrangements, and evolved as an efficient means to deal with the internationalization of crime. Transnational terrorism is an extreme form of international crime, but it is very often supported by other types of organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking, weapons trading, and document fraud. One of the main objections from abroad of the U.S.’s conduct of the war on terrorism has been the perceived disregard for the “rule of law,” particularly among our European allies. While some critics might find the worldwide unification of law enforcement cause for concern, this work will argue that the potential for human rights abuses are far more likely under war conditions and intelligence operations than by globally enabled police. While the potential for human rights abuses certainly exists, national law enforcement elements respecting their own “rule of law” and the laws of counterpart nations will find the means to cooperate within existing legal frameworks. Th is work will also argue that international police cooperation is one way that weak nations can serve to build their own governmental infrastructures and contribute in a positive way to international relations. There will be those who will assert that the current manner in which the United States deals with gathering terrorism information from our present intelligence posture provides adequate worldwide coverage of the problem. But even a cursory analysis of the numbers of sources available to worldwide police networks versus rational estimates of intelligence assets will show those assertions to be implausible. There are also those who might argue that international police interaction is problematic because police are an instrument of force and are endowed with powers that can be abused. This concern is valid in that abuse of police powers can readily impact human rights. The idea of informal international police relationships that are unregulated and therefore lack accountability can seem a slippery slope. However, the trend since 9/11 has been to attempt to integrate law enforcement with functions of intelligence services — as what occurred in the United States with the FBI. This linkage is gaining acceptance and is being implemented throughout Europe but it is implicitly far more slippery. The intelligence service/law enforcement dichotomy is primarily one of legal versus extra-legal constructs. Intelligence services are extra-legal forces unconstrained by legality and matters of sovereignty — and they too can be, and often are, instruments of force. When the two are integrated, the idea of rule of law becomes moot because of the extra-legal prerogatives of intelligence services — “poisoning” the law enforcement function and therefore the rule of law. It is no coincidence that one of the hallmarks of a police state is the convergence of the legal policing and extra-legal intelligence functions. Law enforcement, on the other hand, is legally sanctioned and generally permitted to exercise its authorities for the benefit of the greater good. This work advocates solely for the legal and legitimate exercise of the rule of law through international police cooperation, whether through formal channels or through the much more powerful and effective informal networking. If a nation’s laws forbid informal police cooperation, so be it. But national governments should recognize the positive role that international police cooperation can serve — not the least of which is serving the right of the people (or the people of other nations) not to be exploited, molested, or harmed by external criminal forces. Eight years later we are still experiencing the after-eff ects of the 9/11 attacks. When the consequences can be nuclear, biological, or chemical, especially in these precarious times, can we afford to deny our public the benefits of such a powerful instrument of counterterrorism—the informal networks made available to U.S. law enforcement? Details: Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2010. 205p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2011 at: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Shelf Number: 121720 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringInternational CooperationInternational Law EnforcementInternational PolicingNational SecurityPolicing NetworksRule of LawTerrorism |
Author: Derks, Maria Title: Improving Security and Justice Through Local/ Non-State Actors: The Challenges of Donor Support to Local/Non-State Security and Justice Providers Summary: Local/non‐state actors often play an important role in the provision of justice and security services in many of the world’s fragile and (post‐)conflict countries. With a view to improving their effectiveness, donors seeking to support justice and security development in those countries frequently look for ways to incorporate them in their programmes. However, given that non‐state actors can also be detrimental to local security and justice (for example when they form part of organized crime), supporting them also involves huge risks. With this dilemma in mind, the Clingendael Institute’s Conflict Research Unit investigated conceptual, policy and practical opportunities and challenges for including local/non‐state security and justice networks in security and justice programming. The project consisted of a conceptual desk‐study; case studies in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi; and a synthesis phase focusing on the lessons learned from the project, complemented by an expert brainstorm meeting, on the practical issues that donors must deal with if they are to successfully include local/non‐state actors in security and justice programmes. The present report summarizes the findings from this synthesis effort. It concludes that in each of the cases examined, it was possible to identify local/non‐state actors suitable for support and ways to support them. They included actors such as local courts, lay judges, neighbourhood watch groups, community development councils, and trade associations. However, the research also identified a number of practical risks and challenges that donors need to manage and overcome in order to ensure that such actors are included effectively into broader, overall security and justice programmes. These broadly fall into five categories. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2012. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2012 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20120400_derks_improving_security.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20120400_derks_improving_security.pdf Shelf Number: 125257 Keywords: Crime Prevention ProgramsNational SecurityNon-State Actors |
Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority Summary: The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, which makes the understanding of these new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate theory of constraints activity, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, into the potential for trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, which yields billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year. These same leaders have a publicly articulated, common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. The central binding element in this alliance is a hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and deep anti-Semitism, based on a shared view that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a transformative historical event. For Islamists, it is evidence of divine favor; and for Bolivarians, a model of a successful asymmetrical strategy to defeat the “Empire.” The primary architect of this theology/ideology that merges radical Islam and radical, anti-Western populism and revolutionary zeal is the convicted terrorist Ilich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal,” whom Chávez has called a true visionary. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 Shelf Number: 126258 Keywords: Criminal NetworksHuman RraffickingMoney LaunderingNational SecurityOrganized Crime (Latin America)TerrorismTransnational CrimeWeapons of Mass Destruction |
Author: Shaw, Mark Title: Leadership Required: Drug Trafficking and the Crisis of Statehood in West Africa Summary: Beginning in the middle of the last decade, the international community was alerted to the fact that drug trafficking in West Africa was in danger of spawning a series of near ‘narco-states’: countries whose economies, politics and social structures were being infiltrated and distorted by the drug trade. Some seven years later, after an inadequate and uncoordinated response to that call to arms, the inevitable has happened. Where previously cocaine trafficking was one of the most important challenges the subregion faced, this has compounded exponentially, deepening a crisis of statehood that may be difficult to reverse. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has just started the first phase of a year-long research project funded by the National Endowment for Democracy on the relationship between statehood and illicit trafficking in West Africa. Recent interviews conducted on the ground in the subregion highlight unequivocally that current attempts at solving drug trafficking throughout West Africa have not achieved their stated objectives. Of more importance, however, is that they bring to the fore the seeming absence of political will – either nationally or internationally – to address the problem. This policy brief aims to remind any actor or institution that is serious about democracy, sustainable development and human security that a ‘business as usual’ approach to the problem of trafficking in West Africa should not be accepted. This is no longer an issue of crime, law enforcement, or security, but strikes at the core of the human rights, democratic and humanitarian foundations upon which global governance rests. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2012. 6p. Source: ISS Policy Brief No. 37: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2012 at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No37Oct2012Drugs.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No37Oct2012Drugs.pdf Shelf Number: 126697 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (West Africa)Human Security (West Africa)Narcotics and Crime (West Africa)National SecurityOrganized Crime (West Africa) |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Left in the Dark: The Use of Secret Evidence in the United Kingdom Summary: Over the past decade, there has been an ever increasing reliance on secret evidence by the UK government in the name of national security. Amnesty International believes that this growing resort to secrecy undermines basic standards of fairness and open justice, can result in violations of the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy for victims of human rights violations, as well as contributing to failures by the UK to meet its obligations to hold those responsible for human rights violations to account and to refrain from sending people to a real risk of serious human rights violations at the hands of another state. This report examines the increased use of what is described as a “closed material procedure”, which allows the government to rely on secret evidence presented to the court behind closed doors, in a range of non-criminal judicial proceedings in the UK. Closed material procedures are usually invoked in cases involving persons suspected of terrorismrelated activity. Such a procedure allows a court or tribunal to sit in a closed (i.e. secret) hearing in order to consider material presented by UK authorities. Closed material is information that the government claims would be damaging to national security or otherwise harmful to the public interest if it were to be disclosed. This material is withheld for the entire case (and indeed perhaps forever) from the individual(s) whose interests are at stake in the case, her/his lawyer of choice, and the public, none of whom has access to the closed hearing.1 As a result of their exclusion from the closed hearing, they do not know the content of that material, even though the court can rely on it to determine the facts and outcome of the case. “Closed material” is essentially a form of secret evidence and marks a radical departure from what traditionally are understood to be basic requirements of fairness in civil and criminal procedures. Details: London: Amnesty International Publications, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/014/2012/en/546a2059-db83-4888-93ba-8b90cc32a2de/eur450142012en.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/014/2012/en/546a2059-db83-4888-93ba-8b90cc32a2de/eur450142012en.pdf Shelf Number: 126758 Keywords: Evidence (U.K.)National SecurityTerrorismTrials |
Author: Ahokas, Juha Title: Assuring Supply Chain Continuity in Industrial Supply Chains and Complying with Authorised Economical Operator AEO Europe. Final Version Summary: Secure and reliable supply chains and networks enable companies to utilize global markets and resources. Outsourcing and globalization have enabled enterprises to extent their operations to new areas and benefit from economies of scale. Global logistic chains have turned out to be effective platform for the delivery of materials, semi-products and goods between the different economic areas and markets. The development has been beneficial to international companies and economic welfare has increased in several countries. On the other side, dynamic and complex supply chains enable opportunities for criminal action. They create platform for terrorism, crime and illegal competition. Some transnational and poly-crime oriented organized crime groups are aiming at controlling the whole production and distribution processes of entire criminal markets, optimizing profits and cutting out local and minor competitors, on a very rational way. To reach their goal they exploit transportation and financial sector, hire illicit labour to run and manage the supply chain, engage in money laundry, identity frauds and document forgery. International supply chains have turned out to be vulnerable for any crime actions and crime concerns have increased in companies and governments. Especially organized crime and terrorism pose threats to security and safety, to public health, to the environment or to consumers. Traditionally different companies and authorities have concentrated on securing their own operations and sphere of responsibilities. However, supply chain crimes are intertwined in supply chain operations, which transmit forward and reverse goods, services, cash and information. Relying only on inspections or border controls has proven to be always costly leaving doubts concerning the adequate inspection rate. Enterprises have very limited possibilities to self-acquire information related to the backgrounds of their business partners and prospect employees. Generally, crime is recognized to devastate social structures and fair competition. Additionally, private and political interest have emphasized crime preventive approach instead of post-crime measures, thus different kind of customs-government-trade partnerships are endorsed with mutual interest. The terrorist attacks in 2001 formed culmination point to concerns and approaches how to deal with terrorism and crime in supply chains. Since April 2002 several voluntary supply chain security programs and regulations have been established in global trade. The aim of the programs is simply to increase security in international supply chains. The companies fulfilling the security and safety criteria are considered to be secure and safe partners in the supply chain. The reliable traders respecting high standard security criteria benefit from trade facilitation measures: reduced data set for summary declarations, fewer physical and document-based controls, and priority treatment if selected for control. Supply chain security programs can be regarded as good international policy and practices when aiming at better secure supply chains against an intended posed crime act (theft, pilferage, money laundry, currency counterfeiting, industrial espionage, commodity counterfeiting, documents counterfeiting, malicious damage etc.). Additionally, implementation of programs have enabled several companies to gain collateral benefits, including better visibility to the supply chain, swifter response in case of any type of disruptions and lower insurance premiums. However, between security measures and benefits stands a black box, which makes unclear how security programs should be managed to maximize benefits. This publication aims at revealing the inner-side of the black-box. The guide presents and applies practices and procedures, which are approved in a sister discipline that is criminology. Rational choice and situational crime prevention are well-known approaches, which bring criminology down to earth in daily practices and decisions. Rational choice approach takes into consideration a variation and composition of potential crime offenders‘ motivations and capabilities to commit crimes. It supports security efforts and decisions concerning the strategic supply chain and operational design. Situational crime prevention approach provides tools to reduce the opportunities to commit crime and increase the risk of detection if deterrence fails. It focuses on crime opportunities in daily operations and resembles total quality management approach, which is well-known, proved and tried in supply chain and operational management. At last, situational crime prevention approach and total quality management approach are combined in new conceptual model for crime prevention in supply chains. AEO-programs are not self-explaining and self-executing programs. Quite the contrary, they just build a framework, where the compliance with requirements can be attained in several ways. We introduce an implementation model, which is based on teacher-learning cycle aiming at the most cost-efficient implementation in different companies and business units in various cultural conditions. Additionally, it supports government-private partnerships. The model is based on continuous improvement cycle. This guide has 10 chapters with following aims: Chapter 1 elucidates the background of supply chain security programs by presenting World Customs Organization‘s SAFE-program. Chapter 2 works as an incentive to start implementing AEO-supply chain security program. It lists potential benefits, which can be used as financial targets in implementation process. The list of benefits is based on comprehensive literature study. Chapter 3 describes how security issues are included in daily operations. Crime prevention and operational management practices are programmed in same conceptual framework. Chapter 4 elucidates AEO-requirements and appropriate security measures based on available security standards. Chapter 5 suggest methods allocate security resources in an efficient manner. Besides traditional risk assessment approach we emphasize inner-organizational co-operation and efficient communication when tracing crime related problems. Chapter 6 presents an implementation model based on continuous improvement and teaching-learning cycle. Chapter 7 presents customs AEO -audit approach. We give advises how the process could be conducted in an efficient way. Chapter 8 suggest an activity based cost management model, which makes security cost more transparent and traceable. Chapter 9 gives a short description concerning supply chain security technologies. Chapter 10 presents a short summary. Details: Helsinki: Aalto University, School of Science and Technology, BIT Research Centre, 2012. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://legacy-tuta.hut.fi/logistics/publications/Assuring_SC_Continuity.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://legacy-tuta.hut.fi/logistics/publications/Assuring_SC_Continuity.pdf Shelf Number: 126764 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCriminal NetworksNational SecurityPorts-of-Entry, SecurityRational Choice TheorySituational Crime PreventionSupply ChainsTerrorism |
Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace Summary: This report presents some of the results of a fiscal year 2011 RAND Project AIR FORCE study on the integration of kinetic and nonkinetic weapons, “U.S. and Threat Non-Kinetic Capabilities.” It discusses the management of cybercrises throughout the spectrum from precrisis to crisis to conflict. The basic message is simple: Crisis and escalation in cyberspace can be managed as long as policymakers understand the key differences between nonkinetic conflict in cyberspace and kinetic conflict in the physical world. Among these differences are the tremendous scope that cyberdefense affords; the near impossibility and thus the pointlessness of trying to disarm an adversary’s ability to carry out cyberwar; and the great ambiguity associated with cyberoperations—notably, the broad disjunction between the attacker’s intent, the actual effect, and the target’s perception of what happened. Thus, strategies should concentrate on (1) recognizing that crisis instability in cyberspace arises largely from misperception, (2) promulgating norms that might modulate crisis reactions, (3) knowing when and how to defuse inadvertent crises stemming from incidents, (4) supporting actions with narrative rather than signaling, (5) bolstering defenses to the point at which potential adversaries no longer believe that cyberattacks (penetrating and disrupting or corrupting information systems, as opposed to cyberespionage) can alter the balance of forces, and (6) calibrating the use of offensive cyberoperations with an assessment of their escalation potential. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 24, 2013 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf Shelf Number: 127383 Keywords: Computer CrimeCyberattacksCybercrime (U.S.)National SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Jackson, Emily Lindsay Title: Broadening National Security and Protecting Crowded Places - Performing the United Kingdom's War on Terror, 2007-2010 Summary: This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part applies critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive policy responses. The second part carries out an exploratory case study of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero tolerance' risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices. The thesis uses an innovative methodological and conceptual strategy combining Foucauldian discourse analysis of security policies, participant observation of situated security practices, with theoretical frameworks from political geography, international relations and visual culture. It also develops Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as a conceptual tool to critique the materialisation of contemporary spaces of security and counter-terrorism, from the meta-imaginative geographies of national security to the micro-spaces of counter-terrorism in UK public space. In sum, this thesis points towards new avenues for understanding the on-going encroachment of the war on terror into everyday spaces in the UK Details: Durham, UK: Durham University, Department of Geography, 2012. 265p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 4, 2013 at: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Shelf Number: 128666 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrowd ControlNational SecurityPublic Order ManagementPublic SpaceTerrorism (U.K.) |
Author: Price, Michael Title: National Security and Local Police Summary: The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted a national effort to improve information sharing among all levels of law enforcement, including on the local level. Federal money poured into local police departments so they could fulfill their new role as the "eyes and ears" of the intelligence community. But how do local police departments go about collecting intelligence? What guidance do they use? What standards or policies, if any, must they adhere to? To learn how state and local agencies are operating in this domestic intelligence architecture, the Brennan Center surveyed 16 major police departments, 19 affiliated fusion centers, and 14 JTTFs. What we found was organized chaos - a sprawling, federally subsidized, and loosely coordinated system designed to share information that is collected according to varying local standards. As detailed in the following report, this headlong rush into intelligence work has created risks that hurt counterterrorism efforts and undermine police work. The lack of oversight, accountability, and quality control over how police collect and share personal information about law-abiding Americans not only violates their civil liberties of Americans, but creates a mountain of data with little to no counterterrorism value. Details: New York: Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, 2013. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2014 at Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf Shelf Number: 131768 Keywords: CounterterrorismIntelligence GatheringInteragency CooperationNational SecurityPolicing Networks |
Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market Summary: There is a general perception that there is a shortage of cybersecurity professionals within the United States, and a particular shortage of these professionals within the federal government, working on national security as well as intelligence. Shortages of this nature complicate securing the nation's networks and may leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out conflict in cyberspace. RAND examined the current status of the labor market for cybersecurity professionals - with an emphasis on their being employed to defend the United States. This effort was in three parts: first, a review of the literature; second, interviews with managers and educators of cybersecurity professionals, supplemented by reportage; and third, an examination of the economic literature about labor markets. RAND also disaggregated the broad definition of "cybersecurity professionals" to unearth skills differentiation as relevant to this study. In general, we support the use of market forces (and preexisting government programs) to address the strong demand for cybersecurity professionals in the longer run. Increases in educational opportunities and compensation packages will draw more workers into the profession over time. Cybersecurity professionals take time to reach their potential; drastic steps taken today to increase their quantity and quality would not bear fruit for another five to ten years. By then, the current concern over cybersecurity could easily abate, driven by new technology and more secure architectures. Pushing too many people into the profession now could leave an overabundance of highly trained and narrowly skilled individuals who could better be serving national needs in other vocations. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html Shelf Number: 132617 Keywords: Computer CrimeCyberattacksCybercrime (U.S.)CybersecurityInternet CrimeNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Monsalve, Ivan Title: Transnational Criminal Organisations and their impact on the States National Security Summary: Globalization era had brought the opening of boundaries and technological changes taken by Organized Crime to developed and became a transnational threat that affects all states in its security, stability and prosperity. This threat turns out to be a challenge for the National Security of the States and the International Community not only locally, but also regionally and globally. This dissertation analyse the patterns of the Transnational Crime activity, which permeate and destabilize the legal and constitutional systems within the nations and which then turn threaten the National Security. Since the end of the Cold War The transnational crime organisations are consider a new threat to the States National Security, affecting its security, stability and prosperity. The main issues questions that can be answer along this paper are: how great a threat does transnational crime pose within different nations? Do criminal organisations act differently within different nations? What are their methods and behaviours? How do criminal organisations use new technologies to establish an international network? How do criminal organisations develop their business skills, to facilitate their growth and establish economic sustainability? What kinds of methods are used by these organisations to gain control of territory within a nation? Details: London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: Seaford House Paper: Accessed August 23, 2014 at: http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2013-seaford-house-papers/shp-2013-monsalve.pdf/view Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2013-seaford-house-papers/shp-2013-monsalve.pdf/view Shelf Number: 131354 Keywords: Criminal Networks National SecurityOrganized Crime Transnational Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of Defense Title: Internal Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting: A Report to the Secretary of Defense Summary: On September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis, a Navy contractor employee with a Secret security clearance, shot and killed 12 U.S. Navy civilian and contractor employees and wounded several others at the Washington Navy Yard. Alexis was also killed. Alexis was employed by The Experts, Inc., a private information technology firm cleared under the National Industrial Security Program. The Experts was a subcontractor to Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Services, which was performing work under a contract with the Department of the Navy. Pursuant to his employment with The Experts, Alexis was assigned to a project at the Washington Navy Yard and began working there on September 9, 2013. On September 14, 2013, Alexis purchased a Remington 870 12-gauge shotgun and ammunition at a gun shop in Northern Virginia. He also purchased a hacksaw and other items at a home improvement store in Northern Virginia, using the hacksaw to modify the shotgun for concealment. On the morning of September 16, Alexis arrived at the Washington Navy Yard. He had legitimate access to the Navy Yard as a result of his work as a contractor employee and used his valid building pass to gain entry to Building 197. Shortly after his arrival in the building and over the course of about one hour, Alexis used the Remington 870 shotgun and a Beretta handgun he obtained during the attack to kill 12 individuals and wound 4 others before he was shot and killed by law enforcement officers. On September 30, 2013, the Secretary of Defense initiated concurrent independent and internal reviews to identify and recommend actions that address gaps or deficiencies in DoD programs, policies, and procedures regarding security at DoD installations and the granting and renewing of security clearances for DoD employees and contractor personnel. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2013. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD-Internal-Review-of-the-WNY-Shooting-20-Nov-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD-Internal-Review-of-the-WNY-Shooting-20-Nov-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 133310 Keywords: Active Shooter Gun-Related ViolenceHomicidesInternal SecurityNational SecuritySecurity Policies Workplace Violence |
Author: Great Britain. National Crime Agency Title: National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2014 Summary: If there is a single cross-cutting issue that has changed the landscape for serious and organised crime and our response against it, it is the growth in scale and speed of internet communication technologies. The online streaming of real-time child sexual exploitation and abuse is a growing threat. Cyber techniques have proliferated and are used ever more extensively by wider serious and organised crime groups to commit 'traditional' crimes (see Section 1: Cross-cutting issues for cyber-enabled crime). As more government services go online, including tax collection, there is an increasing risk of online attacks and fraud against the public sector. Large scale attacks on public as well as private online services erode consumer confidence, which affects the UK's social and economic well-being and reduces the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business. 84% of all cases of identity fraud are delivered by the internet. The pace of development of deployable criminal tools is such that we anticipate an increase in the targeted compromise of UK networked systems, more ransom-ware attacks and distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks against business-critical systems. Corruption is another key cross-cutting issue, the impact of which is disproportionate to the level and frequency at which it occurs, with serious ramifications in terms of confidence towards the public and private sectors and in undermining trust in government. Proceeds of corruption and bribery amounting to millions of pounds from some international politically exposed persons (PEPs) have been laundered through UK financial systems including banks and investment property. The scale of the laundering of criminal proceeds, despite the UK's leading role in developing international standards to tackle it, is a strategic threat to the UK's economy and reputation. Some of the same financial transfer systems used by serious and organised criminals in the UK are also used by terrorist groups both domestically and overseas. The UK and its dependent territories are believed to have been the destination for billions of pounds of European criminal proceeds. We assess that the supply of heroin from Afghanistan, amphetamine processing/production in the UK and the supply of new psychoactive substances are all likely to increase, and that the supply of cocaine from South America is likely to remain at a high rate. The impact of the illegal drugs trade in the countries where they are sourced and those through which they are trafficked can be significant and undermines states and government structures. In some cases it has the potential to damage UK strategic partnerships. Human trafficking is widely recognised as a significant global problem. Work to scope the extent of criminality behind the trafficking of human beings continues in order to improve the understanding of modern slavery. We assess that irregular migrants already in the UK will continue to provide a pool of people that serious and organised criminals can exploit by selling them forged or counterfeit documents to support fraudulent applications for leave to remain in the UK. We also assess that criminal exploitation of the legitimate supply of firearms to the UK marketplace will increase. There is also a concern that weapons, whether from illegal or legitimate sources, might find their way into the hands of extremists. All of the most serious crime threats are transnational. Commodities of all types - including, for example, trafficked people destined for modern slavery, intangibles targeted in fraud and cyber crime - either come from or transit through often unstable countries. Corruption in these countries both feeds off the proceeds of the crime and contributes in turn to instability. The criminal exploitation of corrupt and unstable governments or countries can directly threaten UK national security. Details: London: National Crime Agency, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2014 at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file Shelf Number: 133466 Keywords: Child Sexual ExploitationCybercrimeDrug TraffickingHuman TraffickingIllegal DrugsIllegal GunsNational SecurityOnline VictimizationOrganized Crime (U.K.)Violent Crime |
Author: Inserra, David Title: The Visa Waiver Program: Enhancing Security, Promoting Prosperity Summary: The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is a valuable tool supporting U.S. tourism and trade, public diplomacy, and national security. The VWP allows residents of member countries to visit the U.S. without a visa for up to 90 days in exchange for security-cooperation and information-sharing arrangements and reciprocal travel privileges for U.S. residents. The VWP is extended only to U.S. allies and friends that meet certain security and immigration requirements. News of European passport holders joining the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), however, have created concerns about radicalized Western fighters abusing the VWP to engage in terrorism here in the U.S. While radicalized Britons or Germans are certainly of great concern to all nations threatened by Islamist terrorism, it is not a good reason to end the VWP. The VWP promotes security and the ISIS threat only emphasizes the importance of the VWP's intelligence-sharing requirements and adding appropriate nations to the program. Details: Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2014. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Brief No. 4274: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/IB4273.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/IB4273.pdf Shelf Number: 134085 Keywords: National SecurityPassportsVisas |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles: A Guide Summary: 1.1 In its National Security Strategy in 2010 the Government made clear that serious and organised crime (SOC) is a national security threat which needs an effective cross-government and law enforcement response. 1.2 Serious and organised crime includes: trafficking and dealing in drugs, people, weapons and counterfeit goods; sophisticated theft and robbery; fraud and other forms of financial crime; and cyber crime and cyber-enabled crime. It also includes modern slavery and child sexual exploitation. 1.3 Law enforcement agency estimates tell us that over 30,000 people are engaged in serious and organised crime in this country, operating in over 5,000 groups. We think that the cost to government from their activities is at least $24 billion each year and likely to be very much more.1 That figure does not include costs to the private sector: to protect itself from serious and organised crime the financial sector alone spends $10 billion each year. 1.4 In 2010 the Government made a commitment to develop a new national law enforcement organisation - the National Crime Agency (NCA) - to co-ordinate work against serious and organised crime in this country. The NCA was launched in 2013. 1.5 At the same time the Government published a new strategy to deal with serious and organised crime which was agreed by all the ministers represented at the National Security Council. The strategy and a high level summary are available online at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/248646/Serious_and_organised_crime_strategy_pamphlet.pdf. 1.6 The strategy deliberately uses the framework developed for counter-terrorist work and has four main objectives (the 4Ps): - PURSUE: prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised crime; - PREVENT: preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime; - PROTECT: increasing protection against serious and organised crime; - PREPARE: reducing the impact of this criminality where it takes place. 1.7 The strategy starts from an important assumption. Neither the police nor the NCA on their own can tackle the breadth and complexity of the threat from serious and organised crime. 1.8 Like other threats to our national security, serious and organised crime requires a response across the whole of government, and close collaboration with the public, the private sector and with many other countries. 2.1 This guidance provides an overview of the development, distribution and effective use of Local Profiles on serious and organised crime. 2.2 Police forces will continue to conduct most law enforcement work on serious and organised crime. They should be supported by new local, multi-agency partnerships, including representatives from local authorities, education, health and social care, and Immigration Enforcement. The effect must be to ensure that all available information and powers are brought to bear locally against serious and organised crime. 2.3 These local partnerships will need a common understanding of the threat from serious and organised crime and how it impacts upon local communities. Reflecting relevant learning from counter-terrorism (notably the development of what are known as Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles or CTLPs) and existing good practice in serious and organised crime, we want police forces and the NCA to develop and share Local Profiles of serious and organised crime. 2.4 CTLPs have been produced since 2009, and have been subject to a comprehensive national review of their production and delivery process as well as a stakeholder survey.2 The review identified both examples of good practice and key areas for improvement. The findings were positive and provide a useful evidence base 2 National Counter-Terrorism Local Profile Review (December 2009) and Ipsos Mori (January 2010) for the content of this guidance. Key findings were that CTLPs: - are a useful and engaging resource and a catalyst for closer partnership working and local action; - are generally well received and valued, and briefings are - and should - become 'business as usual' for many force areas; - need to contain information that is relevant, up to date and localised; - should provide practical recommendations that partners can own and progress; and - should be shared more widely and with greater consistency. 2.5 This guidance is aimed particularly at the police and local partnerships that should be using Local Profiles to inform their action plans to tackle serious and organised crime. It should also be shared with other serious and organised crime partners where appropriate. Much of the information it contains will also be helpful to non-Home Office police forces, other enforcement agencies and partners in devolved administrations which are responsible for reducing the level of serious and organised crime. Details: London: Home Office, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 18, 2014 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/371602/Serious_and_Organised_Crime_local_profiles.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/371602/Serious_and_Organised_Crime_local_profiles.pdf Shelf Number: 134120 Keywords: National SecurityOrganized Crime (U.K.)PolicingViolent Crimes |
Author: Australia. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Title: Martin Place Siege: Joint Commonwealth - New South Wales review Summary: The Martin Place siege on 15 and 16 December last year was both an atrocity and a tragedy. The review found that there were no major failings of intelligence or process in the lead up to the siege. It is nonetheless important we learn whatever lessons At around 8.33 am on 15 December 2014, Man Haron Monis walked into the Lindt Cafe, on the corner of Martin Place and Phillip Street, in the heart of Sydney's commercial district. Shortly thereafter, he produced a gun and ordered that the customers and staff be locked inside as hostages. After a standoff lasting around 17 hours, the siege ended in gunfire. Three people died: two hostages and Monis. Several of the other hostages sustained injuries. The Martin Place siege has deeply affected the community. The Review analysed the events that led up to the siege and the range of interactions Monis had with agencies including the criminal justice system, beginning with his arrival in Australia. It asked: - were the decisions of government agencies in respect of Monis reasonable given the laws and policies in place when the decisions were made? - should decision-makers have had other information before them when making their decisions? Overall, the Review has found that the judgments made by government agencies were reasonable and that the information that should have been available to decision-makers was available. Changes to laws and policies in relation to national security involve judgments about public safety and personal liberty - i.e. the risk framework within which society operates. We expect that public discussion and consultation about these judgments will continue over the coming months as further information about the circumstances of the conduct of the Martin Place siege operation becomes available. However, the Review has concluded that some modest changes are needed to our laws and government processes to mitigate the public security risks exposed by this case. Some of these changes are already being made. For example, new bail arrangements have now been introduced in New South Wales. New programmes to counter violent extremism in the community are being developed. Other initiatives, such as a review of immigration policies, laws and capabilities in relation to visa applications should be pursued. The Review's recommendations would maintain broadly the current balance in our existing regulatory and legislative framework. The Review's decision to not propose steps beyond this is based on our view that introducing substantial further controls involves a larger choice about the sort of society we wish to live in and is properly the province of the public and our elected representatives. Any further controls would be based on judgments as to whether increases in policing, surveillance and controls and the related extra burden on the taxpayer and intrusions into Australians' lives would make us appreciably safer. Details: Canberra: Australian Government, 2015. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/martin_place_siege_review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/martin_place_siege_review.pdf Shelf Number: 134913 Keywords: Deadly Force (Australia)Decision MakingExtremistsHostage TakingNational SecurityViolent Extremism |
Author: Moens, Alexander Title: Cybersecurity Challenges for Canada and the United States Summary: The Internet was designed not with security in mind, but rather openness and the free flow of information. The resulting globally connected Internet has brought unprecedented levels of information and commercial exchange, contributed enormous gains to individual prosperity, and promoted and expanded individual liberty. Only in recent years have governments, militaries, industries, firms, and individuals come to grips with how to protect legitimate activity in cyberspace without compromising the Internet's open character. Overemphasizing security can restrict freedom and stifle entrepreneurial potential. Conversely, liberty in cyberspace without an appreciation of cybersecurity presents rising commercial and governmental costs as well as unacceptable threats to national security. One study on the economic costs of cyberespionage and other forms of cyberattack estimates the global costs at between $375 billion and $575 billion annually, and a range of nation-states, state-linked groups, and non-state actors are exploiting cyberspace to conduct espionage, military operations, and large-scale theft of intellectual property. Although there have been calls for international norms of behaviour and rules of the road in cyberspace, treaties and arms control as developed and understood in the conventional, nuclear, and chemical realm are not easily transferred to the domain of cyberspace. Nevertheless, the rule of consequences and of self-interest is in play, as is the logic of cost-benefit in escalation. Still, cyberattacks continue, increasing in quantity and quality, which is why resilience is the watchword of cyberspace. As in other zones of commerce and theatres of operation, Canada and the United States are deeply integrated in cyber-space. Canada draws a clear net benefit from close cooperation with the United States in cyberspace because both the nature of the evolving threat and the nature and cost of countering this threat are increasingly more difficult for a state to address on its own. At the same time, as it cooperates with the United States and other close allies, the Canadian government faces the challenge of finding a balance between security and the Canadian definition of freedom. As the powers of Canadian government agencies expand and coordination with US agencies and other allied agencies increases, the task of providing cybersecurity should not be left to the specialized agencies without a layer of oversight by elected representatives. As Canada updates its ability to deal with threats in cyberspace, it needs to enhance the ability of its representative government to oversee this important work. Details: Calgary, AB, Canada: Fraser Institute, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2015 at: http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/publications/cybersecurity-challenges-for-canada-and-the-united-states.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/publications/cybersecurity-challenges-for-canada-and-the-united-states.pdf Shelf Number: 135115 Keywords: CybercrimesCybersecurityInternet CrimesNational Security |
Author: Cole, Jared P. Title: Terrorist Databases and the No Fly List: Procedural Due Process and Hurdles to Litigation Summary: In order to protect national security, the government maintains various terrorist watchlists, including the "No Fly" list, which contains the names of individuals to be denied boarding on commercial airline flights. Travelers on the No Fly list are not permitted to board an American airline or any flight on a foreign air carrier that lands or departs from U.S. territory or flies over U.S. airspace. Some persons have claimed that their alleged placement on the list was the result of an erroneous determination by the government that they posed a national security threat. In some cases, it has been reported that persons have been prevented from boarding an aircraft because they were mistakenly believed to be on the No Fly list, sometimes on account of having a name similar to another person who was actually on the list. As a result, various legal challenges to placement on the list have been brought in court. The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Accordingly, when a person has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the government must follow certain procedures. Several courts have found that placement on the No Fly list may impair constitutionally protected interests, including the right to travel internationally, and the government's redress procedures must therefore satisfy due process. Typically, due process requires that the government provide a person with notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral party. However, the requirements of due process are not fixed, and can vary according to relevant factors. When determining the proper procedural protections in a given situation, courts employ the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, which weighs the private interests affected against the government's interest. Courts applying this balancing test might consider several factors, including the severity of the deprivation involved in placement on the No Fly list. In addition, courts may examine the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedural framework and the potential value of imposing additional procedures on the process. Finally, courts may inquire into the government's interest in preserving the status quo, including the danger of permitting plaintiffs to access sensitive national security information. Resolution of the issue is currently pending as at least two federal courts have ruled that the government's redress procedures for travelers challenging placement on the No Fly list violate due process. The government is currently revising this process, although the precise details of what the new program will entail are unclear. Litigation is further complicated by several legal hurdles, such as the state secrets privilege, that can bar plaintiffs from accessing certain information during litigation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43730: Accessed April 15, 2015 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Shelf Number: 135235 Keywords: Due ProcessHomeland SecurityNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: United States. Postal Service. Office of Inspector General Title: Postal Inspection Service Mail Covers Program Summary: In fiscal year 2013, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service processed about 49,000 mail covers. A mail cover is an investigative tool used to record data appearing on the outside of a mail-piece. Law enforcement agencies use this information to protect national security; locate fugitives; obtain evidence; or help identify property, proceeds, or assets forfeitable under criminal law. A mail cover is justified when it will further an investigation or provide evidence of a crime. The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for recording and forwarding the data to the Postal Inspection Service for further processing. Postal Service and law enforcement officials must ensure compliance with privacy policies to protect the privacy of customers, employees, and other individuals' information. Our objective was to determine whether the Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service are effectively and efficiently handling mail covers according to Postal Service and federal requirements Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Postal Service, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Report No. HR-AR-14-001: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2014/hr-ar-14-001.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2014/hr-ar-14-001.pdf Shelf Number: 135373 Keywords: Crime PreventionEvidence National SecurityPostal Inspection (U.S.) |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is mandated to provide assistance to requesting countries in the legal and criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. Its Terrorism Prevention Branch is leading this assistance delivery, primarily by assisting countries to ratify the international legal instruments against terrorism, incorporate their provisions in national legislation and build the capacity of the national criminal justice system to implement those provisions effectively, in accordance with the rule of law, including human rights. The Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum is one of the tools developed by the Branch for transferring the knowledge and expertise needed to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice officials to put the universal legal framework against terrorism into practice. This knowledge transfer is pursued through: - Direct training of criminal justice officials - Train-the-trainers activities - Supporting national training institutions of criminal justice officials (schools of judges and prosecutors, law enforcement academies and other relevant institutions) to develop/ incorporate counter-terrorism elements in their curricula The Curriculum consists of several modules, each dealing with specific thematic areas of the legal and criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. Its first five modules are: - Module 1. Counter-Terrorism in the International Legal Context (under preparation) - Module 2. The Universal Legal Framework Against Terrorism (issued) - Module 3. International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Counter-Terrorism (issued) - Module 4. Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (this issue) - Module 5. Transport related (civil aviation and maritime) Terrorism Offences (being issued) Details: New York: UNODC, 2014. 222p. Source: Internet Resource: Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum MODULE 4 Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf Shelf Number: 135623 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHuman RightsNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Eby, Charles A. Title: The Nation That Cried Lone Wolf: A Data-Driven Analysis of Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11 Summary: Lone-wolf terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States throughout the country's history. Attempted attacks from individual terrorists unaffiliated with terrorist groups may be becoming more prevalent. Both the general public and government officials acknowledge the presence and importance of these attacks; however, relatively little literature exists on the subject compared to group terrorism. Much of the information on lone wolves has been established by case study, inference, and known characteristics of group terrorism. The purpose of this study is to analyze the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorism through formal statistical models. The study then synthesizes data with case study and existing literature to formulate a base of knowledge for lone-wolf terrorism. This study demonstrates that no single dispositional profile of a lone-wolf terrorist exists. The individuals who engage in the tactic of lone-wolf terrorism form a unique ideology that combines personal grievances with common terrorist goals. Still, many lone-wolf cases exhibit certain characteristics. This thesis analyzes these characteristics and their relationship with successful attacks. These data on characteristics, goals, and motivations of lone wolves purport policies to increase engagement between the community and curb lone-wolf terrorism and its effects. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6789/12Mar_Eby.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6789/12Mar_Eby.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 135629 Keywords: Lone Wolf TerroristNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Cortes, Carlos Title: Communications Surveillance in Colombia: The Chasm between Technological Capacity and the Legal Framework Summary: Last year, media outlets revealed that the National Police of Colombia would operationalize the Single Platform for Monitoring and Analysis (Plataforma Uinica de Monitoreo y Anailisis, or PUMA), through which it would be able to intercept "what is spoken, written or sent from e-mails, Facebook, Twitter, Line, Viber, Skype, and, in short, any type of communication undertaken via the internet." More recently, last February, Semana magazine revealed that the military was reviewing e-mails and chats of those involved in the peace talks in Havana, Cuba. In both cases, the government put its spin on the news. In the first case, the government presented PUMA as nothing more than the replacement of an older system, and stressed that it would be subject to legal controls. In the second, the Colombian president quickly announced the formation of a commission to develop the country's policy on cybersecurity and cyberdefense. Nonetheless, the underlying issues remain unsolved. What is, in the end, the technical capacity of PUMA? Is it possible to review anyone's e-mails? Can the military access someone's chat history? Is intercepting a phone call the same thing as intercepting internet traffic? Although new scandals regarding state intelligence emerge periodically in Colombia, the state never clarifies how intelligence works in practice or what controls exist for its exercise. Meanwhile, as time moves on, intelligence schemes grow more sophisticated along with our cell phones and computers. An analog rotary-dial telephone is as obsolete as "crocodile cables" used to intercept calls. Nonetheless, as the market facilitates the process of obsolescence and the incorporation of new massive technologies, it tells us little about the devices that are simultaneously developed to monitor individuals. Technological changes tend to alter long-established assumptions regarding the reach of specific rights. Privacy is arguably the right that faces the most challenges in the digital environment. Yet regulatory and jurisprudential lacunae persist in terms of how technology affects the exercise of fundamental rights. The cases of PUMA and the military's spying on peace negotiators occurred soon after Colombia's adoption of its new Intelligence Law, which, in theory, corrects previous irregularities and aligns with modern surveillance. But is this truly the case? Do we have a regulation that preserves national security without compromising citizens' privacy and freedom of expression, among other rights? The goal of this book is to examine the Colombian legal and jurisprudential framework regarding communications surveillance in light of today's technologies. Phrased in the form of a hypothesis, the purpose is to demonstrate how intelligence-related laws and jurisprudence fail to ensure that potentially affected rights remain intact. To test this hypothesis, I address several aspects of the country's Intelligence Law that I selected somewhat arbitrarily: the interception of communications, surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum, and access to user data. This last point, which alone merits its own study, is developed as a complement to the first two. The book is divided as follows: The first chapter explains, from a technical point of view, the technologies that we use to communicate and that are used to monitor us. The second chapter explores the normative framework for communications surveillance. The third offers a comparative look at communications interception. Finally, the fourth chapter synthesizes the findings of the first three chapters in an effort to offer several conclusions. Details: Bogota: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 3: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: http://www.dejusticia.org/files/r2_actividades_recursos/fi_name_recurso.683.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.dejusticia.org/files/r2_actividades_recursos/fi_name_recurso.683.pdf Shelf Number: 135766 Keywords: CommunicationsCyber-securityIntelligence GatheringNational SecurityPrivacySurveillance |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Interim Report of the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel Summary: Created as part of the homeland security eorganization of 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the single, unified agency to protect and secure our nation's borders. CBP is by far the largest law enforcement agency of our country. In terms of its more than 44,000 arms carrying, sworn law enforcement officers, CBP is more than double the size of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and substantially larger than New York Police Department (NYPD), the largest local police force in the U.S. Unquestionably, CBP is far more effective in performing its border protection mission than was the case pre-2003 when border enforcement authority and personnel were fragmented into four separate agencies aligned within three different departments of government. Yet as a border agency with a national security and law enforcement mission, CBP is vulnerable to the potential for corruption within its workforce which, if not detected and effectively investigated, could severely undermine its mission. Moreover, it is imperative, as with all law enforcement, that CBP officers and agents avoid using excessive and unnecessary force in carrying out their duties. To this end, it is essential that CBP be capable of effectively investigating and deterring the potential unlawful and out-of-policy use of force by its personnel . It is within this context that in December 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security requested the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to create the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel ("Panel"), a subcommittee of the HSAC, in order to take stock of and evaluate the progress of CBP regarding its efforts to deter and prevent corruption and the use of excessive force and its efforts to restore public confidence through more transparency with key stakeholders and the public. As part of the Secretary's tasking, he requested recommendations based upon law enforcement best practices regarding further steps needed to assure the highest level of integrity, compliance with use of force policy, incident response transparency, and stakeholder engagement. The Secretary's six specific tasking's are set forth in his letter to the HSAC dated December 9, 2014. (See Appendix B) This interim report discusses integrity and use of force/transparency issues separately, yet some of our recommendations apply to both. A prime example is our recommendation that the number of criminal investigators in CBP's Office of Internal Affairs (IA) be substantially increased. An adequately staffed IA is essential to giving CBP the capacity to timely and thoroughly investigate all allegations of corruption as well as all use of force violations of CBP policy. Since its inception less than four months ago, in March 2015, the Panel has met and reviewed numerous prior reports, gathered a prodigious amount of data and met with and interviewed dozens of representatives of CBP, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), various stakeholders and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). This is our first interim report and recommendations with more to follow in the future. Given the extraordinary importance of maintaining integrity and assuring compliance with use of force policy, the Panel believes that consideration of our recommendations, and action upon them, should not await our final report. Details: Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2015 at: http://soboco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report_FINAL_062915.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://soboco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report_FINAL_062915.pdf Shelf Number: 136026 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityNational SecurityUse of Force |
Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines. Summary: The tri-border area (TBA) between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia has been identified as a key hub of terrorist and related criminal activity in Southeast Asia. This geographical space is a well-known transit zone for weapons, explosives, and personnel, as well as a principal logistical corridor for local and transnational terrorist groups. The U.S. government has devoted considerable resources to promoting maritime security initiatives in this region and, through a variety of capacity-building efforts, has been at the forefront of underwriting initiatives in each of the three countries. This approach has necessarily been country-specific, with an eye toward developing solutions that uniquely fit each nation. However, the ultimate goal has been to encourage cooperation and interoperability, both among the recipient states and with the United States. One of the most interesting collaborative initiatives is the evolving Coast Watch System (CWS) in the Philippines. Originally designed to improve maritime domain awareness in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, the concept has now been extended to cover the entire Philippine archipelago. This occasional paper analyzes the security environment in the TBA; evaluates the CWS and the challenges it has yet to overcome; and considers the prospects for an initiative to eventually form the basis of an integrated system of maritime security that would tie together the three states that converge in the TBAMalaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The main purpose of this document is to act as a building block to guide further work on how best to establish an effective and viable system of regional maritime security architecture in this sensitive but understudied part of the world. Further analysis on maritime domain awareness (MDA) efforts by Malaysia and Indonesia would usefully complement this study. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. The document should be of interest to the national security community, as well as academics, analysts, and informed members of the public interested in Southeast Asian security issues. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed July 28, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf Shelf Number: 136162 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security National SecurityOrganized Crime Terrorism |
Author: Australia. Auditor General Title: Cyber Attacks: Securing Agencies' ICT Systems Summary: 1. Governments, businesses and individuals increasingly rely on information and communications technology (ICT) in their day-to-day activities, with rapid advances continuing to be made in how people and organisations communicate, interact and transact business through ICT and the Internet. In the government sector, ICT is used to deliver services, store and process information, and enable communications, with a consequent need to protect the privacy, security and integrity of information maintained on government systems. 2. Cyber crime is an international problem, and it is estimated that in 2012, 5.4 million Australians fell victim to such crimes, with an estimated cost to the economy of $1.65 billion. In the government sector, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) has estimated that between January and December 2012, there were over 1790 security incidents against Australian Government agencies. Of these, 685 were considered serious enough to warrant a Cyber Security Operations Centre response. 3. The protection of Australian Government systems and information from unauthorised access and use is a key responsibility of agencies, having regard to their business operations and specific risks. In the context of a national government, those risks can range from threats to national security through to the disclosure of sensitive personal information. Unauthorised access through electronic means, also known as cyber intrusions, can result from the actions of outside individuals or organisations. Individuals operating from within government may also misuse information which they are authorised to access, or may inappropriately access and use government information holdings. 4. For some years, the Australian Government has established both an overarching protective security policy framework, and promulgated specific ICT risk mitigation strategies and related controls, to inform the ICT security posture6 of agencies. In 2013, the Government mandated elements of the framework, in response to the rapid escalation, intensity and sophistication of cyber crime and other cyber security threats. Details: Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Report No. 50 2013-14: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2013%202014/Audit%20Report%2050/AuditReport_2013-2014_50.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2013%202014/Audit%20Report%2050/AuditReport_2013-2014_50.pdf Shelf Number: 136699 Keywords: Cyber SecurityCybercrimeInternet CrimesInternet SecurityNational Security |
Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Identity crime and misuse in Australia: Results of the 2014 online survey Summary: To understand the trends associated with identity crime and misuse in Australia, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was, in 2014, commissioned by the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department to undertake a national survey of the problem for the second time. The study is one of a series of initiatives being implemented as part of the National Identity Security Strategy, Australia's national response to enhancing identity security, which seeks to prevent identity crime and misuse, contribute to national security and facilitate the benefits of the digital economy. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series no.130: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/130/rpp130.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/130/rpp130.pdf Shelf Number: 136754 Keywords: Identity TheftNational Security |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: No More Excuses: A Roadmap to Justice for CIA Torture Summary: This 153-page report sets out evidence to support the main criminal charges that can be brought against those responsible for state-sanctioned torture, and challenges claims that prosecutions are not legally possible. The report also outlines US legal obligations to provide redress to victims of torture, and steps the US should take to do so. It also details actions that other countries should take to pursue criminal investigations into CIA torture. Details: New York: HRW, 2015. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us1115_web_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us1115_web_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137730 Keywords: Human Rights Abuses National SecurityTorture |
Author: Grantham, David Title: Shutting Down ISIS' Antiquities Trade Summary: The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, reminded the world that the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is at war with western civilization. The U.S. government desperately needs a more comprehensive strategy for combating this threat than simply drone warfare and piecemeal deployments of "specialized expeditionary targeting forces." And a top priority of a new, broader campaign should be the destruction of ISIS' financial networks. ISIS and Antiquities. ISIS poses a national security threat to the United States primarily because of the resources it commands. The organization boasts an impressive network of revenue streams, ranging from oil proceeds and racketeering profits to money seized from local banks. But ISIS also profits from its lucrative trade in pilfered Roman, Greek, and other antiquities found in Syria and northern Iraq. This lucrative operation presents a national security dilemma because it helps fund ISIS's international war machine. The U.S. government and international bodies have tried in the past to undermine the global trade in looted antiquities by international conventions that disallow signatory countries from participating in the theft and transportation of looted antiquities. But the illegal antiquities market remains notoriously difficult to regulate. Moreover, officials often treat the illegal antiquities trade as a victimless crime run by criminal organizations. Few acknowledge the definitive links between illegal antiquities and terrorism. The challenges of enforcement and lack of attention keeps the market for illicit antiquities strong. This Is Not a Recent Phenomenon. During World War II, Nazis looted public and private collections from across Europe. Looters reaffirmed the importance of the antiquities market by ransacking regional museums in Iraq in the wake of the First Gulf War. Between the end of the war in 1991, and 1994, eleven museums lost 3,000 artifacts and 484 manuscripts to theft. A majority have yet to be recovered. Years later, the Taliban earned a reputation as a broker of Afghan antiquities, even though it spent enormous time and energy destroying historical landmarks throughout the country. Al Qaeda was also involved in the trade. In 1999, Mohamed Atta, who piloted the plane that crashed into Tower Two of the World Trade Center, tried to sell Afghan antiquities to a German university professor. Atta "claimed that he was selling artifacts in order to purchase an airplane." The Iraqi museums looted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 only reiterated the national security implications surrounding unprotected antiquities. As of 2008, authorities have only recovered about 6,000 of the 15,000 items stolen. Experts fear that Al-Qaeda offshoots like ISIS are today selling some of the unaccounted for antiquities to fund their terrorist operations. Details: Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 185: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Shelf Number: 137760 Keywords: AntiquitiesIllegal TradeISISIslamic StateNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: van der Laan, Franca Title: The Future of Police Missions Summary: The current security situation in the world, and specifically the zones of instability that surround and affect Europe, provide the Netherlands with many good reasons to contribute police capabilities to international crisis management missions. The EU, UN and OSCE struggle with both quantitative and qualitative personnel shortages when it comes to deploying police in missions. In qualitative terms, the increasing complexity of police mandates in missions, the multi-dimensional approach to security sector reform and other forms of crisis management and the shift of attention from observation and monitoring missions to mentoring, training, and capacity-building missions asks for high quality experts and senior leaders. NATO will continue to need police capabilities that can operate under a military command structure for the performance of its executive police duties, and, in exceptional cases, for urgent SSR tasks, in conflict situations where no other actors are present that can take up these tasks. Providing that the efforts in creating stability are successful, police deployment in multilateral operations abroad can prevent or reduce future spill-over effects from the crises these operations address. With both the Royal Marechaussee and the Netherlands' Police as donor organisations, the Netherlands has a broad and well developed policing toolkit that can in many ways meet, or adapt to, the demand of the IOs. In order to match the increasing demand for police contributions, increasing the contribution of NP and/ or KMar staff to multilateral operations should be taken into consideration. The study argues to focus these contributions on a set of niches that fits both the IOs' demand and national (security) policy objectives. More specialisation can enhance the quality of deployed staff or teams, it can streamline the relative competency discussion between the KMar and NP and it would sharpen the profile of the Netherlands as a supplier of policing capabilities. Details: The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2016. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/The%20Future%20of%20Police%20Missions.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/The%20Future%20of%20Police%20Missions.pdf Shelf Number: 137921 Keywords: Crisis ManagementNational SecurityPolice EffectivenessPolice Policies and PracticesPolicing |
Author: Miklaucic, Michael Title: Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization Summary: Acceleration. Magnification. Diffusion. Entropy. Empowerment. The global environment and the international system are evolving at hypervelocity. A consensus is emerging among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners that recent sweeping developments in information technology, communication, transportation, demographics, and conflict are making global governance more challenging. Some argue these developments have transformed our international system, making it more vulnerable than ever to the predations of terrorists and This view continues to dominate mindsets within the U.S. national security community. It fails to fully appreciate the growing power of nonstate actors and adversaries, or the magnitude of the threat they pose and the harm they impose on the international system itself. It underappreciates the possibility - indeed likelihood - of the convergence, whether for convenience or growing ambition, of criminal, terrorist, and even insurgent networks. More important even than insufficient recognition of the efficacy of these adversaries is the absence of a plan to counter the threat they pose to both national security and the international state system. In short, this view does not see the big picture - the long view of the declining robustness and resilience of the global system of nation-states that has been dominant for centuries, and the unprecedented attacks on that system. The failure of that system - in which we and so many have prospered beyond belief or precedent in history - would be a catastrophic and existential loss. Global trends and developments - including dramatically increased trade volumes and velocity, the growth of cyberspace, and population growth, among others - have facilitated the growth of violent nonstate actors, the strengthening of organized crime, and the emergence of a new set of transcontinental supply chains as well as the expansion of existing illicit markets. The resourcefulness, adaptability, innovativeness, and ability of illicit networks to circumvent countermeasures make them formidable foes for national governments and international organizations alike. Their increasing convergence gives them ever-improved ability to evade official countermeasures and overcome logistical challenges as well as ever better tools for exploiting weaknesses and opportunities within the state system, and attacking that system. Since illicit actors have expanded their activities throughout the global commons, in the land, sea, air, and cyber domains, nations must devise comprehensive and multidimensional strategies and policies to combat the complex transnational threats posed by these illicit networks. This book is an attempt to map the terrain of this emerging battlespace; it describes the scope of the security threat confronting the United States and the international community from transnational criminal organizations and what is being done to combat that threat - from the strategic level with the release, in July 2011, of the U.S. Government's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security and, in April 2011, of the Department of Defense (DOD) Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy - to the operational level with increased regional partnerships and dialogues. criminals. Others argue that despite this significant evolution, organized crime, transnational terrorism, and nonstate networks have been endemic if unpleasant features of human society throughout history, that they represent nothing new, and that our traditional means of countering them - primarily conventional law enforcement - are adequate. Even among those who perceive substantial differences in the contemporary manifestations of these persistent maladies, they are viewed as major nuisances not adding up to a significant national or international security threat, much less an existential threat. Details: Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013. 304p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf Shelf Number: 131162 Keywords: Criminal NetworksIllegal TradeIllicit MarketsIllicit TradeNational SecurityOrganized CrimeTerrorism |
Author: Pinheiro, Alvaro de Souza Title: Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces Summary: If combined special operations are to be conducted effectively in the complex strategic environment of a post 9/11 world, then it is necessary to have a sound understanding of each nation's interests, defense policies, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and practices. This monograph contributes to that goal by exploring avenues for U.S.-Brazilian SOF interaction and cooperation. It provides on an overview of Brazil, its national security and defense policy, and current relations with the United States. This monograph describes the history and present organization of Brazilian SOF and considers its future. To this end, the purpose of this monograph is to offer the U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) community a portrait of Brazilian SOF in areas such as the Tri-Border Area of the Southern Cone, and other operational environments. Details: MacDill AFB F: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-7: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Shelf Number: 138476 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtremist GroupsNational SecurityViolence |
Author: Australian Government Title: Australia's Cyber Security Strategy: Enabling innovation, growth and prosperity Summary: Strong cyber security is a fundamental element of our growth and prosperity in a global economy. It is also vital for our national security. It requires partnership involving governments, the private sector and the community. Being connected is now essential, creating new opportunities for innovation and growth for all Australians. To be competitive, businesses need to be online. But this also brings risks. Australia is increasingly a target for cybercrime and espionage. All of us- governments, businesses and individuals- need to work together to build resilience to cyber security threats and to make the most of opportunities online. To grow, Australia needs to innovate and further diversify its economy-to access new markets and new forms of wealth creation. We must embrace disruptive technologies; those that have the potential to fundamentally change traditional business models and the way people live and work. They will open up new possibilities for agile businesses in ways as yet unimagined. But the potential of digital technologies depends on the extent to which we can trust the internet and cyberspace. Getting cyber security right will mean we capture more of the opportunities the connected world offers. It will also make Australia a preferred place to do business. This in turn will boost our national prosperity. We can also expand our cyber security businesses and export capability. Australia's cyber security is built on a solid foundation. Our past investment has been strong. Recent Government initiatives such as the Australian Cyber Security Centre have lifted Government capabilities to a new level. Many of our larger businesses, particularly banks and telecommunications companies, have strong cyber security capabilities. Our future work will build on this platform. Details: Canberra: Office of the Prime Minister, 2016. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 26, 2016 at: https://cybersecuritystrategy.dpmc.gov.au/assets/img/PMC-Cyber-Strategy.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://cybersecuritystrategy.dpmc.gov.au/assets/img/PMC-Cyber-Strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138819 Keywords: Cyber SecurityCybercrimeInternet CrimeNational Security |
Author: Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, DC) Title: After Action Report: Washington Navy Yard, September 16, 2013. Internal Review of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C. Summary: On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation's Capital in recent memory. Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others. Over the years, the members of MPD, along with other area law enforcement agencies and emergency responders, have trained extensively for the possibility of an "active shooter" incident. The Department did so with the hope of never having to respond to such a tragedy, but in the wake of Columbine, Virginia Tech, Aurora, Fort Hood, and Sandy Hook, among other similar tragedies, MPD recognized the importance and necessity of those preparations. As the primary law enforcement agency for the Nation's Capital, the members of MPD are acutely aware of the many potential targets that exist within the city and the need to remain prepared and vigilant. On September 16, 2013, hundreds of police, fire, and emergency medical personnel from several different agencies responded to the Navy Yard after receiving news of the shooting. Officers relied upon their training, experience, and instincts to run into an unfamiliar and massive building, towards the gunshots and certain danger, in order to stop the gunman from taking more lives. Details: Washington, DC: Metropolitan Police Department, 2014. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 5, 2016 at: http://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/MPD%20AAR_Navy%20Yard_07-11-14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/MPD%20AAR_Navy%20Yard_07-11-14.pdf Shelf Number: 138936 Keywords: Gun-Related Violence Homicides Internal Security Mass ShootingsNational SecurityPolice Officer Training |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Extreme Measures: Abuses against Children Detained as National Security Threats Summary: Conflict-related violence and the rise of extremist armed groups such as the Islamic State and Boko Haram has also brought an increase in the detention of children perceived to be "security threats." In countries embroiled in civil strife or armed conflict, children are apprehended and detained without charge for months or even years on suspicion of, or involvement in, violent activity, or due to links to non-state armed groups. Many are subjected to torture, and an unknown number have died in custody. This multi-country report looks at the detention of children perceived as a threat to national security in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Nigeria, Syria, and by the United States. Human Rights Watch urges governments to immediately end all use of detention without charge for children, transfer children associated with armed groups to child protection authorities for rehabilitation, and ensure that children charged with a recognizable criminal offense are treated in accordance with international juvenile justice standards. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/crd_detained0716web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/crd_detained0716web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 140056 Keywords: Child ProtectionConflict-related ViolenceExtremist GroupsJuvenile DetentionNational Security |
Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: The Defender's Dilemma: Charting a Course Toward Cybersecurity Summary: Cybersecurity is a constant, and, by all accounts growing, challenge. Although software products are gradually becoming more secure and novel approaches to cybersecurity are being developed, hackers are becoming more adept, their tools are better, and their markets are flourishing. The rising tide of network intrusions has focused organizations' attention on how to protect themselves better. This report, the second in a multiphase study on the future of cybersecurity, reveals perspectives and perceptions from chief information security officers; examines the development of network defense measures and the countermeasures that attackers create to subvert those measures; and explores the role of software vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses. A heuristic model was developed to demonstrate the various cybersecurity levers that organizations can control, as well as exogenous factors that organizations cannot control. Among the report's findings were that cybersecurity experts are at least as focused on preserving their organizations' reputations as protecting actual property. Researchers also found that organizational size and software quality play significant roles in the strategies that defenders may adopt. Finally, those who secure networks will have to pay increasing attention to the role that smart devices might otherwise play in allowing hackers in. Organizations could benefit from better understanding their risk posture from various actors (threats), protection needs (vulnerabilities), and assets (impact). Policy recommendations include better defining the role of government, and exploring information sharing responsibilities. Key Findings Common Knowledge Confirmed Security postures are highly specific to company type, size, etc.; and there often aren't good solutions for smaller businesses. Quarantining certain parts of an organization offline can be a useful option. Responding to the desire of employees to bring their own devices and connect them to the network creates growing dilemmas. Chief information security officers (CISOs) feel that attackers have the upper hand, and will continue to have it. Reasonable Suppositions Validated Customers look to extant tools for solutions even though they do not necessarily know what they need and are certain no magic wand exists. CISOs want information on the motives and methods of specific attackers, but there is no consensus on how such information could be used. Current cyberinsurance offerings are often seen as more hassle than benefit, only useful in specific scenarios, and providing little return. Surprising Findings A cyberattack's effect on reputation (rather than more direct costs) is the biggest cause of concern for CISOs. The actual intellectual property or data that might be affected matters less than the fact that any intellectual property or data is at risk. In general, loss estimation processes are not particularly comprehensive. The ability to understand and articulate an organization's risk arising from network penetrations in a standard and consistent matter does not exist and will not exist for a long time. Recommendations Know what needs protecting, and how badly protection is needed. It was striking how frequently reputation was cited by CISOs as a prime cause for cybersecurity spending, as opposed to protecting actual intellectual property. Knowing what machines are on the network, what applications they are running, what privileges have been established, and with what state of security is also crucial. The advent of smart phones, tablets, and so forth compounds the problem. Know where to devote effort to protect the organization. A core choice for companies is how much defense to commit to the perimeter and how much to internal workings. Consider the potential for adversaries to employ countermeasures. As defenses are installed, organizations must realize they are dealing with a thinking adversary and that measures installed to thwart hackers tend to induce countermeasures as hackers probe for ways around or through new defenses. Government efforts aren't high on CISO's lists, but governments should be prepared to play a role. By and large, CISOs we interviewed did not express much interest in government efforts to improve cybersecurity, other than a willingness to cooperate after an attack. Yet it seems likely that government should be able to play a useful role. One option is to build a body of knowledge on how systems fail (a necessary prerequisite to preventing failure), and then share that information. A community that is prepared to share what went wrong and what could be done better next time could produce higher levels of cybersecurity. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf Shelf Number: 140475 Keywords: Computer Crime Cyberattacks Cybercrime (U.S.) Cybersecurity Internet CrimeNational Security Terrorism |
Author: Fielding, Marcus Title: War, Law and Order: Case Study: Australian Whole-of-Government Efforts to Develop Security and Criminal Justice Sectors Summary: This paper begins with a description of an Australian Special Forces raid in Afghanistan where civilians were killed and wounded. The subsequent White Paper prompted several questions: What exactly are 'situations of armed conflict short of conventional war'? How does the Australian Defence Force (ADF) 'establish a secure environment in conflict zones'? What role should the ADF play in a 'stabilization' situation? And what can we do to further develop a 'whole-of-government' effort? And have we adequately organized, trained and equipped Australian forces 'for conflicts within societies'? To answer these questions, this paper examines how the Australian Government can assist another state government to restore and maintain public security by developing capacity in its security and criminal justice sectors. But this paper is not just about Australia because Australia's experiences are not unlike those being experienced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others. This is particularly relevant as the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more of an area of an interest to U.S. National Security. This paper first examines the origins, nature and prevalence of intra-state conflicts. It shows that one common feature of the ADF's interventions over the last few decades has been that forces have often been deployed in support of another state government, and in many instances the immediate and essential task has been to assist in restoring and maintaining public security. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: PKSOI Papers: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://knxup2.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=719206 Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://knxup2.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=719206 Shelf Number: 147820 Keywords: National SecurityPeacekeepingPolicingPublic Security |
Author: Goitein, Elizabeth Title: The New Era of Secret Law Summary: On June 8, 2004, The Washington Post revealed the existence of a previously secret memorandum drafted by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which concluded that the laws prohibiting torture did not bind officials interrogating suspected members of Al Qaeda or the Taliban. This was the first in a series of legal opinions that became known as the "torture memos." These documents parsed the domestic and international laws against torture and, in seeming contradiction to their plain terms and historical implementation, determined that they posed no barrier to a presidentially-ordered regime of waterboarding, so-called "stress positions," slamming against walls, exposure to extremes in temperature, and sleep deprivation. Nearly a decade later, The Guardian broke a different story: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, also known as the "FISA Court," had been secretly authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect the phone records of all Verizon Business customers — and almost certainly the customers of every other major telephone company — since 2006. This appeared to violate Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which allowed the NSA to obtain such records only if it could show the FISA Court they were relevant to an international terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation. The court, it turned out, had secretly interpreted this law to allow the collection of vast amounts of irrelevant records, as long as relevant ones were thought to be buried within them. What these stories had in common was the government’s reliance on "secret law." Both the OLC memos and the FISA Court opinions were authoritative legal interpretations: while they were in effect, they had the same legal force as the statutes they interpreted. Both were concealed from the public and shared with only select members or committees of Congress. And both construed the law in a way that was at best counter-intuitive, resulting in a dynamic where the law on the books misled the public, rather than enlightening it, as to the rules the government was actually following. Americans intuitively understood that this was wrong. In 2008, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on "secret law," culminating in the introduction of a bill that would have required OLC to notify Congress when it concludes that a statute does not constrain the executive branch. Although the full Senate never considered the bill, the secrecy of OLC opinions has remained controversial, and efforts to pry them loose through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits continue. In 2015, Congress required the Director of National Intelligence to make public significant FISA Court opinions, in redacted or summarized form where necessary. Yet despite the instinctive backlash against secret legal opinions by OLC and the FISA Court, there is much about secret law that remains poorly understood. What qualifies as "law" — and, for that matter, how “secret” the law must be in order to raise concerns — are threshold questions that have received little attention. Similarly, few are familiar with the role secret law has played in U.S. history, which provides critical context for the phenomenon we are seeing today. And while the term "secret law" prompts visceral discomfort, it is important to understand why secret law is of greater concern than other forms of government secrecy that we tolerate and even condone. The objections to secret law should be articulated, not assumed. Most of all, there is scant public understanding of the depth and scope of the problem. OLC opinions and FISA Court opinions are the only two manifestations of secret law that regularly make headlines. But OLC and the FISA Court are not the only government entities that make law. Moreover, the factor driving secrecy in OLC and FISA Court opinions — namely, a dramatic increase in the scope of national security activities and authorities — is a potent force throughout much of government. How common is security-driven secret law, and where else is it occurring? Solving the problem of secret law raises its own set of questions. Are there cases in which disclosure of rules or legal interpretations, even with sensitive facts redacted, could harm national security? How great is that risk, and how does it compare with the harms of secret law? What procedural and substantive reforms could help ensure that the public’s interests in both the transparency of laws and the security of the nation are best served? This report attempts to shed light on these questions, beginning with the foundational inquiry into what secret law is. Details: New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2016. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 28, 2016 at: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Era_of_Secret_Law.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Era_of_Secret_Law.pdf Shelf Number: 140870 Keywords: Homeland Security National SecuritySurveillance Terrorism Torture |
Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Beyond Convergence: World Without Order Summary: The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a "high warning" -- or worse -- in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade. State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty. A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror. An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends -- convergence, hybridization, and state capture -- poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes "convergence" (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or "battlespaces," and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity -- if not explicit partnership -- between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, "criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks."4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by "the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney Generals Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations." According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State's 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade. The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now out-man, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror. The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old "International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range," of "$1 to $3 trillion" or "two to five percent" of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the "global war on terror" (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion. The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America's post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs -- the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT -- comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico's death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year. Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America's Northern Triangle -- comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala -- resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador's official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000. Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births. Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran's Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted. That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate -- at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state's diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity. North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang's infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Shelf Number: 144992 Keywords: Counterfeit TradeIllicit NetworksISISNational SecurityOrganized CrimeSmugglingTerrorismTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Gyles, Roger Title: Certain Questioning and Detention Powers in Relation to Terrorism Summary: This report is to review the operation, effectiveness, and implications, of the relevant legislation, including consideration as to whether it: contains appropriate safeguards for protecting the rights of individuals; remains proportionate to the threat of terrorism, or threat to national security, or both; and remains necessary. Assessment as to whether the legislation is being used for matters unrelated to terrorism and national security is required. I must have regard to Australia's obligations under international agreements and to the arrangements agreed from time to time between the Commonwealth, the States, and the Territories, to ensure a national approach to countering terrorism. A review of div 3 of pt III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act) and any other provision of that Act as far as it relates to that division, pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) (INSLM Act) is required to be completed by 7 September 2017. That division provides the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) with special powers relating to terrorism offences, being questioning warrants (QWs), and questioning and detention warrants (QDWs), and related matters. That time limit requires that the review take place notwithstanding s 9 of the INSLM Act. A review of pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) is also one of the functions of the office. That part provides for the detention (and questioning) of persons arrested for Commonwealth offences. Subdivision B of div 2 deals with terrorism offences. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (formerly the Australian Crime Commission) (ACIC) has compulsory questioning powers. The arrangements that are in place mean that those powers apply to certain terrorism offences, and to that extent, may be reviewed pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the INSLM Act. Combining those reviews provides a better perspective than separate reviews and is the best use of limited resources. The existence and exercise of other powers relating to counter-terrorism and national security vested in federal and state bodies form part of the backdrop to this review and report. The previous Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Mr Bret Walker SC, reviewed and made recommendations about ASIO QWs, and QDWs, in chs IV and V of his 2012 Annual Report. He dealt with police powers of questioning post-arrest and pre-charge in Appendix F of the same report, but made no recommendations as to them. He touched on pre-emptive detention for questioning by the then Australian Crime Commission, and the New South Wales Crime Commission, in ch V of that report. The principal recommendation was that QDWs be abolished by repeal of the relevant statutory provisions. That recommendation has not been acted on. Several changes to the QW procedures were recommended, some based on the assumption that QDWs would be abolished. Only some have been adopted. These powers are revisited in this report in light of experience over recent years and the current security situation. This review has involved public and private written submissions, public and private hearings, private consultations, and the voluntary and compulsory provision of information. As much material as possible has been published on the INSLM website. The submissions published there give a comprehensive account of the considerations and arguments that have been advanced and taken into account. It is unnecessary to reproduce all of that information in this report. An account of the review process may be found at Appendix 1. Details: Sydney: Australian Government, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, 2016. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/inslm_certainquestioninganddetentionpowers_feb_2017.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/inslm_certainquestioninganddetentionpowers_feb_2017.pdf Shelf Number: 145788 Keywords: National SecurityTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Miller, Rena S. Title: Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview for Congress Summary: Anti-money laundering (AML) refers to efforts to prevent criminal exploitation of financial systems to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds. Despite the existence of longstanding domestic regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as international commitments and guidance on best practices, policymakers remain challenged to identify and address policy gaps and new laundering methods that criminals exploit. According to United Nations estimates recognized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, criminals in the United States generate some $300 billion in illicit proceeds that might involve money laundering. Rough International Monetary Fund estimates also indicate that the global volume of money laundering could amount to as much as 2.7% of the world's gross domestic product, or $1.6 trillion annually. Money laundering is broadly recognized to have potentially significant economic and political consequences at both national and international levels. Despite robust AML efforts in the United States, the ability to counter money laundering effectively remains challenged by a variety of factors. These include: the scale of global money laundering; the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system; the introduction of new and emerging threats (e.g., cyber-related financial crimes); the ongoing use of old methods (e.g., bulk cash smuggling); gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes, including uneven availability of international training and technical assistance for AML purposes; and the costs associated with financial institution compliance with global AML guidance and national laws. AML Policy Framework In the United States, the legislative foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act. Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits. Key elements to the BSA’s AML legal framework, which are codified in Titles 12 (Banks and Banking) and 31 (Money and Finance) of the U.S. Code, include requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping, reporting, and compliance programs intended to identify and prevent money laundering abuses. Substantive criminal statutes in Titles 31 and 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the U.S. Code prohibit money laundering and related activities and establish civil penalties and forfeiture provisions. Moreover, federal authorities have applied administrative forfeiture, non-conviction based forfeiture, and criminal forfeiture tools. In response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the BSA's AML policy framework to incorporate additional provisions to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). Although CFT is not the primary focus of this CRS report, post- 9/11 legislation provided the Executive Branch with greater authority and additional tools to counter the convergence of illicit threats, including the financial dimensions of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Policy Outlook for the 115th Congress Although CFT will likely remain a pressing national security concern for policymakers and Congress, some see the beginning of the 115th Congress as an opportunity to revisit the existing AML policy framework, assess its effectiveness, and propose regulatory and statutory changes. Such efforts could further address issues raised in hearings and proposed legislation during the 114th Congress, including beneficial ownership, the application of targeted financial sanctions, and barriers to international AML information sharing. Drawing from past legislative activity, the 115th Congress may also revisit proposals to require the Executive Branch to develop a roadmap for identifying key AML policy challenges and balancing AML priorities in a national strategy. Some observers have gone further to propose broader changes to the BSA/AML regime. The 115th Congress may also seek to address tensions that remain in balancing the policy objectives of improving financial services access and inclusion while also accounting for money laundering risks and vulnerabilities that may result in the exclusion (or "de-risking") of others from the international financial system. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44776: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44776.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44776.pdf Shelf Number: 145581 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingNational SecurityOrganized CrimeProceeds of CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Stiles, Daniel Title: Ivory Trade, Terrorism and U.S. National Security: How Connected Are They? Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. This report examines the contention advanced by the United States government that poached ivory is being used to finance insurgency and terrorist groups in Africa. 2. The report also analyzes whether any organized groups that engage in elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in Africa pose a national security threat to the United States, which also has been posited by the government. 3. The U.S. government has used these contentions as a justification for imposing severe new restrictions on the import, export and sale of elephant ivory in the U.S. as declared in USFWS Director's Order No. 210. 4. The three groups that have specifically been named in U.S. documents as financing their activities with poached ivory, and which pose a national security threat, are AlShabaab, the Lord's Resistance Army and the Janjaweed. Each of these groups is examined in this report. 5. This report concludes that the only group under review that poses a national security threat to the U.S. is Al-Shabaab. The evidence that they engage in elephant poaching and finance their terrorist activities with ivory has been found lacking in credibility. 6. The Lord's Resistance Army has poached ivory and exchanged tusks for food and other goods, including possibly arms, at a low level. The LRA do not, however, pose a security threat to the U.S. 7. The Janjaweed have engaged in extensive elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, but they pose no current security threat to the U.S. The Janjaweed do not advocate an extremist Islamic philosophy such as that articulated by Al-Qaeda. Their hostile, scorched earth style military activities have been confined to non-Arab African populations of the Sudan and Central African Republic. 8. The severe new restrictions on trade in legal ivory already in the U.S., therefore, are based on a false premise. Restricting trade in legal ivory in the U.S. will have absolutely no effect on the financing of groups that pose a security threat to the U.S. 9. There is illegal ivory in the U.S. that has been smuggled in. The smuggling would no doubt continue even with further trade restrictions, as it is already illegal so new law will change nothing. The U.S. authorities have been ineffective in administering law already in existence, which is sufficient to control the illegal importation of new ivory from poached elephants if enforced properly. 10. The current elephant poaching crisis is caused by East Asian ivory dealers and carving factories buying poached ivory. Effective policy to reduce elephant poaching should therefore be directed at them, not at law-abiding American citizens. Details: Unpublished report, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Confidential Draft: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://danstiles.org/publications/ivory/42.Ivory&National%20Security.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://danstiles.org/publications/ivory/42.Ivory&National%20Security.pdf Shelf Number: 146424 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal TradeIvoryNational SecurityTerrorist FinancingTrafficking in WildlifeWildlife Crime |
Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: Not a National Security Crisis: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Humanitarian Concerns, Seen from El Paso Summary: Contrary to popular and political rhetoric about a national security crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, evidence suggests a potential humanitarian—not security—emergency. This report, based on research and a field visit to El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico in April 2016, provides a dose of reality by examining one of the most emblematic of the U.S.-Mexico border's nine sectors, one that falls within the middle of the rankings on migration, drug seizures, violence, and human rights abuses. At a time when calls for beefing up border infrastructure and implementing costly policies regularly make headlines, our visit to the El Paso sector made clear that what is needed at the border are practical, evidence-based adjustments to border security policy, improved responses to the growing number of Central American migrants and potential refugees, and strengthened collaboration and communication on both sides of the border. • WITH 408,870 MIGRANT APPREHENSIONS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER IN FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2016, OVERALL UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION IS AT LEVELS SIMILAR TO THE EARLY 1970S. Apprehensions of migrants per Border Patrol agent are less than one-tenth what they were in the 1990s. With 19 apprehensions per agent, FY2015 had the second-lowest rate of the available data. It makes sense that staffing has leveled off since the 2005-2011 buildup that doubled the size of Border Patrol. • THE NUMBER OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS HAS FALLEN TO LEVELS NOT SEEN SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, AND DECLINES HAVE BEEN FAIRLY CONSISTENT. Between FY2004 and FY2015 there were fewer apprehensions of Mexican citizens each year than in the previous year. Apprehensions of Mexicans in FY2016 increased by 2.5 percent. Even though the nearest third country is over 800 miles away from the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexicans comprised less than half of migrants apprehended there in FY2014, and again in FY2016. • OF THE MIGRANTS ARRIVING AT THE BORDER, MANY ARE CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA WHO COULD QUALIFY AS REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION. A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) analysis of credible fear screenings carried out by U.S. asylum officers revealed that in FY2015, 82 percent of women from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, as well as Mexico, who were screened on arrival at the U.S. border "were found to have a significant possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum or protection under the Convention against Torture." This phenomenon is not a threat to the security of the United States. Nor is it illegal to flee one's country if one's life is at risk. Most Central American families and children do not try to evade U.S. authorities when they cross: they seek them out, requesting international protection out of fear to return to their countries. • VIOLENT CRIME RATES IN U.S. BORDER COMMUNITIES REMAIN AMONG THE LOWEST IN THE NATION, AND VIOLENCE HAS LARGELY DECREASED ON THE MEXICAN SIDE AS WELL. The El Paso crime rate in 2015 was below the U.S. national average. Although homicides have increased in Ciudad Juárez during 2016, the security situation has dramatically improved from when the city was considered the murder capital in the world in 2010. • SEIZURES OF CANNABIS, WHICH IS MOSTLY SMUGGLED BETWEEN OFFICIAL PORTS OF ENTRY, ARE DOWN AT THE BORDER. However, seizures of methamphetamine and heroin have increased, indicating that more drugs are probably getting across and, in the case of heroin, feeding U.S. demand that has risen to public-health crisis levels. Meth, heroin, and cocaine are very small in volume and are mostly smuggled at official border crossings. Building higher walls in wilderness areas along the border would make no difference in detecting and stopping these drugs from entering the country. • PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE BORDER ARE UNDERSTAFFED AND UNDER- EQUIPPED. As evidenced by the El Paso sector’s continued long wait times, ports of entry remain understaffed and under-equipped for dealing with small-volume, high-potency drug shipments, and for dealing more generally with large amounts of travelers and cargo. Much of the delay in hiring results from heightened screening procedures for prospective Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to guard against corruption and abuse, an important effort in need of additional resources. Screening delays are also the principal reason for a slight recent reduction in Border Patrol staffing. • ALTHOUGH NEW LOCAL REPATRIATION ARRANGEMENTS (LRAS) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO ARE A STEP FORWARD IN PROTECTING MEXICAN MIGRANTS RETURNED AT THE BORDER, SOME CHALLENGES STILL REMAIN IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. Both governments announced in February 2016 the finalization of new LRAs to regulate the return of Mexican migrants at nine points of entry along the border. The agreements represent important efforts of both governments to curtail many of the practices that negatively affect this vulnerable population, such as nighttime deportation. In the El Paso sector, however, repatriated migrants are often returned without their belongings, such as cell phones, identification documents, and money, presenting them with challenges in accessing funds, communicating with family, and traveling in the country. • THERE ARE FEWER COMPLAINTS ABOUT BORDER PATROL DETENTION CONDITIONS AND ABUSE BY AGENTS IN THE EL PASO SECTOR COMPARED TO OTHER PARTS OF THE BORDER. However, there are concerning reports about abuses by CBP agents at El Paso's ports of entry. A May 2016 complaint lodged by several border organizations points to troubling incidents of excessive force, verbal abuse, humiliating searches, and intimidation by agents at the ports of entry in El Paso and southern New Mexico that must be investigated and addressed. • STRONG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN EL PASO HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN MAKING IT ONE OF THE SAFEST U.S.-MEXICO BORDER CITIES. Consistently ranked one of the country’s safest cities of its size, El Paso demonstrates the importance of communication and constructive relationships between communities and border law enforcement agencies. Local and federal authorities and social service organizations interviewed noted interagency coordination, open lines of communication, and strong working relationships throughout the sector. The local policy of exempting offenders of Class C misdemeanors from federal immigration status checks does much to ensure community members' willingness to cooperate with law enforcement without fear of deportation. However, reports of racial profiling do exist, and state-level policy proposals against “sanctuary cities,” if passed, could threaten this trust. • MEXICAN FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROVIDE IMPORTANT SERVICES FOR REPATRIATED MIGRANTS, AND COULD BE A MODEL FOR OTHER MEXICAN BORDER CITIES. Mexico’s National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM) works in close coordination with the one-of-its-kind Juárez municipal government’s office to provide important basic services to repatriated migrants and assist them with legal services, recovering belongings left in the United States, and transportation to the interior of the country. Civil society organizations also provide similar important services to migrants and document abuses by U.S. and Mexican officials. • U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION IS INCREASINGLY FOCUSING ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ISSUES AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS. U.S. agencies provide support for violence reduction efforts in Ciudad Juárez, as well as support for police training and judicial reform for state and federal agents in Chihuahua. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America: Mexico, 2016. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/not-national-security-crisis-u-s-mexico-border-humanitarian-concerns-seen-el-paso/ Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/analysis/not-national-security-crisis-u-s-mexico-border-humanitarian-concerns-seen-el-paso/ Shelf Number: 141369 Keywords: Border SecurityHumanitarian AidImmigrant DetentionImmigrationImmigration and CrimeImmigration EnforcementMigrants and CrimeNational Security |
Author: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Title: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2017 Summary: his yearbook looks at those areas around the world where terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) are in greatest focus. Each chapter examines CT developments in 2016, including the terrorist threat being faced and how governments and others have approached CT through both policy and operations. Countries and regions covered include Australia, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Turkey, UK, USA, Canada, Africa, Russia and China. Through this first Counterterrorism Yearbook, in what will be an annual publication, we aim to promote understanding and contribute to shared knowledge of CT. The authors of individual pieces are Anthony Bergin, Jacinta Carroll, Colin Clarke, Michael Clarke, Virginia Comolli, Greg Fealy, Fadi Hakura, Peter Jennings, Shashank Joshi, Lydia Khalil, Joseph Chinyong Liow, Olga Oliker, Raffaello Pantucci, Thomas Renard, Vern White, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institiute: ASPI, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017/ASPI-Counterterrorism-YB2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017/ASPI-Counterterrorism-YB2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144681 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Chodkowski, William Title: Narcotrafficking in the Americas: An issue of National Security Summary: - Narcotrafficking, in the Western Hemisphere especially, is a threat to America's national security. - The illicit narcotics trade has negative financial and health implications domestically, and undermines rule-of-law, governance, and development internationally. - Despite financial and political motivations that distinguish drug trafficking organizations from insurgency, there is an increasing global nexus between crime and terrorism. - Enforcement and interdiction strategies can help control supply in the short-term, but will not single-handedly contain the problem over the long-run. - Policymakers should channel economic motivations to bilaterally or multilaterally engage Latin American governments in order to build institutions. Details: Washington, DC: American Security Project, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2017 at: https://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200107%20-%20Narcotrafficking%20in%20the%20Americas.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200107%20-%20Narcotrafficking%20in%20the%20Americas.pdf Shelf Number: 131382 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Trafficking National SecurityTerrorist Financing |
Author: Challgren, Jonathan Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model Summary: Countering violent extremism (CVE) has become an increasingly important pillar of national security policy in the United States and was even highlighted in the 2015 National Security Strategy as "more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield". However, CVE is an evolving concept for both policymakers and practitioners alike. Part of Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies, the National Security Critical Issues Task Force (NSCITF) produced this report to provide a comprehensive framework to better conceptualize and implement of CVE. The NSCITF's framework for CVE is based on the public health model, which categorizes prevention into primary, secondary, and tertiary activities. Using the public health model for CVE, the United States Government (USG) and its partners would be better able to define the CVE mission, assign responsibilities for its implementation, and engage effectively in combined action for its execution. Summary of Key Findings 1. CVE has an unclear definition, mission, and leadership structure. 2. Violent extremism shares risk factors with other social ills, enabling the use of preexisting capabilities and resources in its prevention. 3. A multi-sector and non-discriminatory approach enables a holistic strategy using multiple capabilities. 4. Success remains difficult to quantify; the lack of meaningful metrics to evaluate CVE initiatives complicates evidence-based program design and funding decisions Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown Security Studies Review at the Center for Security Studies, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-Report-on-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-Report-on-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145464 Keywords: Extremist Groups National SecurityPublic Health Model Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: U.S. Office of the Director of National Intellilgence Title: Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Summary: This publication comprises inputs from a broad array of participants representing elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and its partners in the domestic field. We thank everyone involved for their time and valuable contributions. The process began with meetings and resulted in many conversations, drafts, revisions, and rounds of coordination with subject matter experts, lawyers, privacy and civil liberties officials, and senior leadership. Over time, we realized the topic is very complex and often characterized differently by the various participants and stakeholders, depending upon their vantage point and mission. Segments explaining the role of specific IC agencies and departments were written and provided by the entity itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence describes the "as is," or current picture, of the operating environment for the IC's key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The next step-one that may be even more complex and challenging - is to move beyond the "as is" descriptions and work toward a vision of the "should be." Challenges aside, we owe it to the American people to strengthen the national security apparatus to best protect our citizens and their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798173 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798173 Shelf Number: 146176 Keywords: Homeland SecurityNational IntelligenceNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Hemmings, John Title: Safeguarding our Systems: Managing Chinese Investment into the UK's Digital and Critical National Infrastructure Summary: - China's investment into Western advanced economies -- including that of the UK -- is increasing and changing in scope surging from EUR 14 billion in 2015 to EUR 20 billion in 2016, a 44% jump. More than 60% of the value of deals has been by state-owned enterprises, indicating this push is led by state strategy than commercial interests. - In 2016, China invested $11.15 billion into the UK. More than double the amount in 2015 and the most in any one year going back to 2005. - China's economic strategy, Made in China: 2025, might threaten the long-term survival of UK businesses unless some sort of government protection is afforded to them or unless China affords British businesses more access to China's home market. - Because of cyber vulnerabilities, critical national infrastructure will be at the forefront of any future war. - The current review system could be improved and rationalised: -- It has allowed access to the UK's digital and critical infrastructure with elements of China's defence industrial concerns -- It has allowed deals that have affected the UK's closest military allies -- It allows for domestic and foreign pressure on the government of the day -- A formal investment screening regime is both necessary and desirable to protect the UK's economic interests and its national security. - A new regime should be built, which is adequately resourced to carry out the difficult task of tracking foreign direct investment (FDI) into the sensitive parts of the UK's economy. - The new regime should begin to coordinate more closely with the UK's closet military and intelligence-sharing allies, including the Five Eyes partners and NATO member states. - Any new regime should carry out its review process in a judicious but swift manner so that foreign investment in the UK is not hampered or harmed. This report suggests that the regime should be sufficiently able to pass its decisions within 30 days of receiving an inquiry. - Ideally, any regime should be overseen by a special committee in Parliament to ensure that it is sufficiently funded and resourced to carry out its activities, and that it is carrying them out in a legal, expedient and sufficient manner. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Safeguarding-Our-Systems-Report-FINAL-Digital.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Safeguarding-Our-Systems-Report-FINAL-Digital.pdf Shelf Number: 146764 Keywords: CybersecurityHomeland SecurityInfrastructure SecurityNational Security |
Author: Great Britain. HM Government Title: National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 Summary: The National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 to 2021 sets out the government's plan to make Britain secure and resilient in cyberspace. The UK is one of the world's leading digital nations. Much of our prosperity now depends on our ability to secure our technology, data and networks from the many threats we face. Yet cyber attacks are growing more frequent, sophisticated and damaging when they succeed. So we are taking decisive action to protect both our economy and the privacy of UK citizens. Our National Cyber Security Strategy sets out our plan to make Britain confident, capable and resilient in a fast-moving digital world. Over the lifetime of this five-year strategy, we will invest L1.9 billion in defending our systems and infrastructure, deterring our adversaries, and developing a wholesociety capability - from the biggest companies to the individual citizen. From the most basic cyber hygiene, to the most sophisticated deterrence, we need a comprehensive response. We will focus on raising the cost of mounting an attack against anyone in the UK, both through stronger defences and better cyber skills. This is no longer just an issue for the IT department but for the whole workforce. Cyber skills need to reach into every profession. The new National Cyber Security Centre will provide a hub of world-class, user-friendly expertise for businesses and individuals, as well as rapid response to major incidents. Government has a clear leadership role, but we will also foster a wider commercial ecosystem, recognising where industry can innovate faster than us. This includes a drive to get the best young minds into cyber security. The cyber threat impacts the whole of our society, so we want to make very clear that everyone has a part to play in our national response. It's why this strategy is an unprecedented exercise in transparency. We can no longer afford to have this discussion behind closed doors. Ultimately, this is a threat that cannot be completely eliminated. Digital technology works because it is open, and that openness brings with it risk. What we can do is reduce the threat to a level that ensures we remain at the vanguard of the digital revolution. This strategy sets out how. Details: London: HM Government, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-security-strategy-2016-to-2021 Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-security-strategy-2016-to-2021 Shelf Number: 147232 Keywords: Computer CrimeCybercrimeCybersecurityInternet CrimesNational Security |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "We Do Unreasonable Things Here": Torture and National Security in al-Sisi's Egypt Summary: Torture has long been endemic in Egypt's law enforcement system. Since 2013, when Egypt's military removed the country's former president, Mohamed Morsy, the Interior Ministry's regular police and National Security Agency have used torture on a systematic and widespread basis against perceived dissidents to force them to confess or divulge information or to punish them. "We Do Unreasonable Things Here": Torture and National Security in al-Sisi's Egypt, is based on interviews with former detainees tortured between 2014 and 2016. The report shows how police and National Security officers use nearly identical methods of torture in different parts of the country. In an environment defined by emergency rule, law enforcement officers in Egypt appear to enjoy a free hand to torture and mistreat detainees as they wish. Their actions are almost never questioned by the judges and prosecutors who should be checking such behavior. The report reiterates the conclusion reached by many previous reports by Human Rights Watch and other organizations, going back several decades, that the legal framework criminalizing torture in Egypt remains inadequate and falls far short of Egypt's basic obligations under international law, allowing abusive officers to escape justice. The report recommends that Egypt urgently establish a special prosecutor or inspector general's office to investigate and prosecute those responsible for torture. Absent credible national efforts to confront the torture epidemic, United Nations member states should investigate and, if appropriate, charge Egyptian officers and officials responsible for torture under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Details: New York: HRW, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2017 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/egypt0917_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Egypt URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/egypt0917_web.pdf Shelf Number: 147329 Keywords: Human Rights AbuseNational SecurityPolice BrutalityTorture |
Author: Lafleur, Jarret M. Title: The Perfect Heist: Recipes from Around the World Summary: Of the many facets of the criminal world, few have captured society's fascination as has that of high stakes robbery. The combination of meticulousness, cunning, and audacity required to execute a real-life Ocean's Eleven may be uncommon among criminals, but fortunately it is common enough to extract a wealth of lessons for the protection of high-value assets. To assist in informing the analyses and decisions of security professionals, this paper surveys 23 sophisticated and high-value heists that have occurred or been attempted around the world, particularly over the past three decades. The results, compiled in a Heist Methods and Characteristics Database, have been analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively, with the goals of both identifying common characteristics and characterizing the range and diversity of criminal methods used. The analysis is focused in seven areas: (1) Defeated Security Measures and Devices, (2) Deception Methods, (3) Timing and Target Selection, (4) Weapons Employed, (5) Resources and Risk Acceptance, (6) Insiders, and (7) Failures and Mistakes. Details: Livermore, CA: Sandia National Laboratories, 2015. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2017 at: https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/1367046 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/1367046 Shelf Number: 147669 Keywords: National SecurityRobberySecurity |
Author: Sheppard, Jill Title: Attitudes to National Security: Balancing Safety and Privacy Summary: The most recent ANUpoll explores Australians' willingness to trade off their personal rights and freedoms for national security. Government responses to the threat of terrorism often incur a cost to citizens, by way of reductions in privacy, freedom of movement, and other individual rights and civil liberties. Such a 'trade-off' approach, where the respect for fundamental liberal rights and values is reconciled with the need for communal security, according to the threat level, is meant to strike an appropriate balance between these two cornerstones of liberalism. Sacrificing some freedoms to protect the Australian community is therefore presented by governments as a necessary cost, but one that is proportionate to the need for safety. Yet this trade-off between increased security and the reduction in some civil liberties also presents a dilemma to democratic societies: namely, the extent to which the risk of terrorist attacks can actually be contained without compromising the defining principles of Australia's liberal order. While in theory the idea of finding an appropriate balance seems straightforward, in practice it can be difficult to determine how much weight should be attached to the respective values of security versus privacy. When examining attitudes towards safety and privacy, it is consequently important to understand national security in terms of not only preventing terrorist violence, but also considering the political consequences any such measures have for our democratic societies. This is why this survey took particular interest in how the public views this increased need for surveillance with regard to the Muslim population, who are commonly perceived as being at a higher risk of radicalization and of being susceptible to violent extremist ideologies. The survey of 1200 Australians finds widespread support for current counter-terrorism measures, such as retention of telecommunications metadata, strict border control policies, revocation of citizenship of 'foreign fighters' with more than one nationality, and bans on travel to sites of certain international conflicts. Even when posed as a trade-off between an individual's rights and the protection of national security, the Australians surveyed express support for freedom-limiting policies in the fight against terrorism. The findings also illustrate substantial public awareness of Muslims identified as being at a higher risk of radicalization and affiliation with terrorist groups than the rest of the population. More importantly, this ANUpoll supports the notion that many Australians conflate terrorism and Islamic extremism, with 22 per cent of Australians 'not much' or 'not at all' bothered by the possibility of Muslims being singled out for additional surveillance and monitoring. This indicates a disconnect from the Australian Government's emphasis on cooperation with the Muslim community over enhanced law enforcement. This is significant insofar as it highlights an ongoing public perception of Muslims in Western societies as a potential danger to national security. This can result in stigmatisation, social divisions, and public backlash against the government counter-terrorism measures from those who feel unfairly targeted. Details: Canberra: Australian National University, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 22: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 148149 Keywords: Extremist ViolenceHomeland SecurityMuslimesNational SecurityTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Organization of American States. Secretariat for Multidimensional Security Title: Report on Citizen Security in the Americas/ Official Statistical Information on Citizen Security provided by the OAS Member States - Informe sobre Seguridad Ciudadana en las Americas 2012 Summary: In 2009, the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS) created Alertamerica, the OAS Hemispheric Observatory on Security, which authorities, security specialists and the general public can visit at www.alertamerica.org. The OAS Hemispheric Observatory on Security contains official data from OAS Member States which is sub-divided into 122 indicators that encompass the totality of areas related to the social phenomena of crime and violence, as well as information on the initiatives undertaken by Member States to control and sanction these. The indicators constitute the widest possible repertoire of official information on these themes in the Americas. It is hoped that they will act as a cause for reflection and debate on a topic which has become the principal source of concern for citizens in our region. It constitutes, moreover, the most appropriate indicators and points of reference for the short, medium, and long-term policies which the American countries have implemented with a view to improving citizen security. The document which the reader has in his/ her hands, The Report on Citizen Security in the Americas 2012, is the second version of the General Secretariat's Annual Report comprising the information available through Alertamerica. The reader will find a synthesis of the current citizen security situation in the Americas, broken down into eighty-two statistical tables, as well as the opinions of renowned experts from throughout the continent on the principle areas of regional concern in this field. Details: Washington, DC: OEA, 2012. 164p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: http://www.oas.org/dsp/alertamerica/Report/Alertamerica2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/dsp/alertamerica/Report/Alertamerica2012.pdf Shelf Number: 148985 Keywords: Crime StatisticsNational SecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Barker, Cat Title: Oversight of intelligence agencies: a comparison of the 'Five Eyes' nations Summary: Executive summary - Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States each have some combination of parliamentary/congressional, independent and judicial oversight of their intelligence agencies, in addition to accountability through the executive branch. However, there are differences in the nature and scope of each of those components. - The six agencies comprising the Australian intelligence community are overseen by a parliamentary committee that examines their administration and expenditure and an independent Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, who examines the legality and propriety of their activities. Most of the agencies' activities and powers are authorised by the responsible ministers. A review completed in June 2017 recommended that the remits of the committee and the Inspector-General be expanded to include four additional agencies, and that the Inspector-General's resources be significantly increased. - Canada has passed legislation creating a committee of parliamentarians to review the policy, administration, finance and operations of Canada's national security and intelligence community. At present, only two agencies are subject to dedicated independent expert review for lawfulness. Canada's national police force, which has responsibility for investigating security offences, is subject to independent expert review. However, this review is limited to handling public complaints about police officer conduct and, with the consent of the Public Safety Minister, undertaking public interest studies of specified activities. A Bill has been introduced that would create a single expert review body mandated to investigate complaints made in relation to the activities of three agencies and to examine the lawfulness, reasonableness and necessity of all national security and intelligence activities undertaken in the federal government. The Bill also proposes the creation of an Intelligence Commissioner to give final approval to certain activities undertaken by Canada's signals intelligence and security intelligence agencies. - New Zealand's Intelligence and Security Act 2017 replaces the four acts that previously applied to the two intelligence and security agencies and their oversight bodies, and implements recommendations from the first periodic review of the agencies. The agencies are overseen by a parliamentary committee, which scrutinises their policies, administration and expenditure, and an independent Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security who ensures that the agencies act with propriety and operate lawfully and effectively. Intelligence warrants may be issued by a responsible minister either solely, or jointly with a Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. - In the United Kingdom, the main focus of the Intelligence and Security Committee is to oversee the expenditure, administration, policies and (with some limitations) operations of the three key intelligence agencies, though it has scope to examine the work of other intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies too. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides independent oversight of the use of intrusive powers by the three key intelligence agencies. The Commissioner, along with several judicial commissioners, is required to keep under review the exercise by public bodies of various statutory functions, and may be directed by the Prime Minister to review any other functions of the three key intelligence agencies. Legislation has been passed under which warrants, currently issued by ministers, will only come into force after being reviewed by a judicial commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal investigates complaints about public bodies' use of investigatory powers. - The United States intelligence community comprises 17 executive branch entities. Congressional oversight of the intelligence community is spread across several committees, including specialised committees on intelligence in the House and the Senate. While each has some limits on what it may examine, taken collectively the committees have the ability to inquire into all of the intelligence-related activities of the US Government. The Executive Office of the President houses several key mechanisms for overseeing the intelligence community, including the President's Intelligence Advisory Board and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. These are augmented by a network of Inspectors General and legal counsels. In addition to Inspectors General attached to specific agencies and departments, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community conducts audits, inspections and investigations of cross-cutting programs and activities. The federal judiciary examines a wide range of intelligence activities under a number of laws, including the Constitution. Most notably, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews applications for warrants related to the collection of foreign intelligence by the US Government. - Despite differences in the approach taken, each of the five countries has developed a framework that includes a system of checks and balances that spans the various branches of government, and which aims to ensure that agencies are accountable for both their administration and expenditure and the legality and propriety of their activities. - The intelligence communities have evolved to meet new challenges as they arise, and will continue to do so. It will be important for the oversight arrangements to keep pace with such changes. Details: Canberra: Australia Department of Parliamentary Services, 2017. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper Series, 2017-18: Accessed March 13, 2018 at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/5689436/upload_binary/5689436.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/5689436/upload_binary/5689436.pdf Shelf Number: 149444 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringNational Security |
Author: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Title: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2018 Summary: he Counter Terrorism Yearbook is ASPI's annual flagship publication curated by the Counter Terrorism Policy Centre, now in its second year of publication. It is a comprehensive resource for academics and policymakers to build on their knowledge of counterterrorism developments in countries and regions around world. Each chapter in the Yearbook is written by internationally renowned subject matter and regional experts, who provide their insight and commentary on counterterrorism policy, legislation, operations and strategy for a specific country/region, concerning the year in review, and looking at challenges for the year ahead. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institiute: ASPI, 2018. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2018 at: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-04/ASPI%20Counterterrorism%20YB2018.pdf?FwGhpI3OBFhspKnvxVLGkUjWHcU_SHrT Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-04/ASPI%20Counterterrorism%20YB2018.pdf?FwGhpI3OBFhspKnvxVLGkUjWHcU_SHrT Shelf Number: 149793 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism National SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Saalman, Lora, ed. Title: Integrating Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure: National, Regional and International Approaches Summary: There seems to be a consensus that cyberattacks resulting in damage to critical infrastructure, such as hospitals and power grids, are a common threat. However, there is a great deal of disagreement on how to define the parameters of and escalation within this arena. In this volume, six experts from industry, government, academia and the legal sector delve deeper into several key target areas of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure-namely system integrity, the role of the private sector and legal frameworks. Their essays provide a baseline for understanding how these issues are unfolding at the national level in Japan, at the regional level in Europe and at the international level under the United Nations. Contents 1. Introduction 2. System integrity and the national level 3. Private sector and the regional level 4. Legal frameworks and the international level 5. Conclusions Details: Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018, 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 7, 2018 at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/integrating_cybersecurity_0.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/integrating_cybersecurity_0.pdf Shelf Number: 150091 Keywords: Critical InfrastructureCybercrimeCybersecurityNational Security |
Author: Birkeland, Jane Title: Extremist Use of Social Media: Balancing Privacy and National Cybersecurity Summary: Social media is used by extremists, terrorists, activists, and ordinary people. The complexity of tackling extremist use of social media lies in balancing the privacy of civilians and US national security interests. Currently, there is a lack of comprehensive policy across industry and government to effectively manage extremist usage-providing a unique dilemma in dealing with extremist use patterns for online recruiting and communication efforts, while maintaining privacy and security for ordinary citizens. We have sought to propose solutions to this dilemma through research of the following aspects of social media usage: - Recruitment and communication efforts between extremists and citizens - Private industry's efforts to balance between online security and privacy - Existing constitutional rights, government policies, and organizations relevant to addressing extremist use of social media - Civil society's role in keeping the government accountable for citizen rights in relation to cybersecurity-related policies Through our research, we found an overall lack of coordination and communication between industry and government, which creates grey areas in current policy and law. The following recommendations have been made to effectively address extremist use of social media: - Civil Society Interaction o Sponsor ad-campaigns that seek to raise awareness of extremist contact via social media and how to approach and report such situations o Begin the education of children and young adults, focusing on internet safety and online extremism o Create an official summit that includes industry and civil society to enhance cybersecurity discourse. - Industry Interaction o Take into account what industry has already implemented when creating new policy o Maintain that the removal of extremist accounts stays in the hands of industry o Allow the legal collection of necessary information by the government and law enforcement if the person(s) in question present a clear and present danger In this report, we will outline extremist use patterns of social media and explore the balance of civilian privacy with national security. We will then address existing government responses to extremist use patterns and end with civil society's role in keeping government accountable to the people it serves. We will lastly demonstrate that the afore summarized recommendations are the best way to effectively address extremist use patterns of social media for fundraising and communication efforts. Details: Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2017. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Task Force Report 2017: Accessed May 10, 2018 at: https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-B-Report_2017_Beyer.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-B-Report_2017_Beyer.pdf Shelf Number: 150141 Keywords: CybercrimeCybersecurityExtremistsNational SecuritySocial MediaTerrorists |
Author: European Court of Auditors Title: Tackling radicalisation that leads to terrorism: the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but with some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation Summary: I. European Union (EU) Member States are responsible for national security, including the fight against terrorism. They are in charge of designing and implementing measures at national level that aim to tackle radicalisation, i.e. the phenomenon of people embracing extremist ideologies and behaviours which could lead them to commit acts of terrorism. As radicalisation is caused by several factors, a wide range of preventive actions are generally deployed to address the problem. The Commission's role is to support Member States in their efforts and help to ensure that good practices are exchanged. To do so, the Commission draws on an increasingly wide range of EU funds. II. Our audit examined whether the Commission manages this cross-cutting support well. In particular, we assessed whether: the Commission provides Member States with relevant support; the actions financed by the different EU funds are coordinated to make the most of any synergies; the Commission has put in place a framework to assess the effectiveness and value for money of its support. III. Overall, we found that the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but there were some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation. IV. The Commission promoted cooperation between Member States through relevant initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network. V. The Commission coordinated its cross-cutting support, for example, by means of consultation between directorates-general when approving work programmes. This has resulted in synergies between its actions. However, despite recent improvements, there is still scope to improve the coordination of Commission actions. For example, the Commission's overview of EU-funded actions in this area does not include those managed by Member States, which would be useful to make the most of potential synergies. We also found that the RAN, one of the Commission's main initiatives, was not used to its full potential to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects. VI. The Commission has not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its support is effective and offers value for money. For example, it has not broken down the overall policy objectives into more specific and measurable objectives, and the funds that the Commission has used are not accompanied by indicators and targets designed to measure success in addressing radicalisation. VII. Moreover, the achievements of specific actions are often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than effectiveness. As a result, there is a risk that useful lessons might not be disseminated or taken into account when the Commission designs actions or develops its policy further. VIII. On the basis of its findings, the ECA recommends that the Commission should: improve the framework for overall coordination of actions addressing radicalisation; increase practical support to practitioners and policymakers in Member States; and improve the framework for assessing results. Details: Luxembourg City, Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 15, 2018 at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 150558 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismNational SecurityRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Rico, Daniel M. Title: The Dimension of International Organized Crime in Colombia: The Bacrim, Routes, and Shelters - La Dimension Internacional del Crimen Organizado en Colombia: Las Bacrim, sus Rutas y Refugios Summary: The dimensions and structures of organized crime in Colombia have been drastically transformed in the last ten years. The clearing part of the paramilitary structures and the advantages of a reintegration process that take several years and I do not include agreements on drug trafficking, it generated a criminal diaspora that incubated the new structures of criminal gangs - more known as Bacrim - initially dedicated to drug trafficking in several regions of Colombia. Since then, around the Bacrim have been generated multiple political, legal debates and to a lesser extent, scholars who argue their similarities and differences vis-a-vis paramilitarism, the challenges that represent the national security and the efficiency of policies public implemented for its containment. However, the understanding and analysis of international dimensions of this generation of criminal organizations have been modest and scarce. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Daniel%20Rico.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Daniel%20Rico.pdf Shelf Number: 151543 Keywords: Criminal GangsDrug TraffickingNational SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: Hong, Kari E. Title: How to End "Illegal Immigration" Summary: Since President Trump has taken office, it is clearer than ever that there are two ways to end "illegal immigration." The first route - started by President Obama and ratcheted up by President Trump with relentless cruelty - is an actual effort to deport millions and exclude millions more. The second is to legalize those without status who have been, are, and will continue to contribute to America's families, communities, and future. This essay argues that the latter choice, restoring the paths to legalization that once were part of our nation's laws, is the only realistic way forward to restore common sense to immigration law. This choice will stop excessive, wasteful, and expensive enforcement measures and invest in people who are making current and future contributions to families, work places, and communities. Developing legal solutions, however, will not come until it is recognized how the term "illegal immigration" originated in popular culture and influenced immigration law with distortions over who merits protection and who does not. Part I then examines the operation of existing immigration law, surveys the origins and misuse of the term "illegal immigrant," and offers that the term "pre-legal immigrant" is the more accurate descriptor of how people are given legal status. Once the false presumption of criminality in the term "illegal immigrant" is exposed, Part II ends with a call to restore needed paths to legalization, which benefit immigrant communities, the citizen family members and employers who rely on their contributions, and the U.S. economy as a whole. Once presumptions are replaced with facts, paths to common sense reform are found for both the short and long term. Details: Massachusetts, 2018. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175484 Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175484 Shelf Number: 151544 Keywords: Illegal Immigration Immigration National Security |
Author: Wiebe, Virgil Title: Immigration Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in Practice? Summary: In March 2016, the University of St. Thomas Law Journal gathered scholars from around the country to discuss whether Sanctuary can make communities secure. Our symposium title, "Can Sanctuary Keep Communities Secure?" played on two contrasting approaches to immigration - the notion of Sanctuary, which often stands in tension with legal authority, and Secure Communities, a controversial immigration enforcement program of the Obama Administration designed (but perhaps not implemented as designed) to deport dangerous immigrants. The conception of this paper arose from the desire to open the symposium by framing issues in the context of Minnesota. I asked the question "What is Sanctuary?" and sought answers from the on-the-ground reality of Minnesota's immigrant communities. The paper answers the question at six levels in the state of Minnesota: (1) the home, (2) houses of worship, (3) educational institutions, (4) cities (and other sub-state authorities such as counties), (5) the state, and (6) national/federal level. "Sanctuary" inherently suggests the need for safety and security, and begs other questions, namely, who needs security and sanctuary, who makes up our community and "homeland" and who gets to speak about and build the legal protections that make up a tapestry of safety. At each level, at least one specific policy/legal issue is addressed (e.g. separation ordinances in the city section, drivers licenses at the state level, and responses to federal enforcement actions) to show how dynamics have played out in Minnesota. I address the dynamics of immigration federalism in Minnesota to assess the state of sanctuary in the land of ten thousand lakes, by identifying institutional and societal actors: the community, the federal government, the state government, regional authorities (most notably sheriffs), city governments, and civil society groups. How individuals inhabit and exercise power within these institutions matters. I conclude that Minnesota is a state of reluctant welcome, and that the forces arrayed for and against immigrants (particularly those of unauthorized status) are in an unsteady balance, with pro-immigrant forces gaining some ground in recent years. The elections of November 2016 at both the state and national levels may mark another shift toward law and order and away from the grace of Sanctuary. Details: S.L., 2017. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: https://ir.stthomas.edu/ustlj/vol13/iss3/6/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1403&context=ustlj Shelf Number: 151545 Keywords: ImmigrationNational SecuritySanctuary Cities |
Author: U.S. White House Title: National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America Summary: America's prosperity and security depend on how we respond to the opportunities and challenges in cyberspace. Critical infrastructure, national defense, and the daily lives of Americans rely on computer-driven and interconnected information technologies. As all facets of American life have become more dependent on a secure cyberspace, new vulnerabilities have been revealed and new threats continue to emerge. Building on the National Security Strategy and the Administration's progress over its first 18 months, the National Cyber Strategy outlines how the United States will ensure the American people continue to reap the benefits of a secure cyberspace that reflects our principles, protects our security, and promotes our prosperity. Details: Washington, DC: The White House, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2018 at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 153898 Keywords: Computer Crime Cyber Security Cybercrime Internet Crimes National Security |
Author: Offerdahl, Thomas G. Title: A Systematic Analysis of the Challenges of Policing Senegal: The Role of the Police in Democracy Summary: Little is known about the role of the police in Africa, and even less about the police in francophone African countries. Intrastate conflicts and peace-building after the Cold War tied policing to personal security, democracy, and sustainable development. Senegal has a stable democracy and police forces that were established prior to Senegalese independence in 1960, but it is still uncertain if they can become a police force that contributes to national and personal security capable of dealing with human and narcotic trafficking, transnational crimes, and international terrorism. This study investigates the challenges facing the Senegalese police forces and their impact on the Senegalese national and personal security environment. The primary police services face challenges with resources, capacity, terrorism, and transnational crime. The major finding is that the centralized structure of the Senegalese police, controlled by a semi-authoritarian president and the political elites, prevents the police from becoming a public safety institution able to address matters of personal security. This dynamic isolates the police from the Senegalese citizens and atrophies their ability to combat crime, preventing their development into a public safety institution. Details: Scranton, Pennsylvania: University of Scranton, 2016. 107. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2019 at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1029883.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Senegal URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50607 Shelf Number: 154387 Keywords: AfricaLaw EnforcementNational SecurityPolicePolicingPublic OrderSenegalTerrorismTransnational CrimeWest Africa |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: AMLO's Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- - Improving public safety, especially reducing Mexico's soaring murder rate, is the toughest challenge of Mexico's new president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (known as AMLO). - In November 2018, AMLO unveiled his National Peace and Security Plan 2018-2024, describing it as predominantly focused on the roots of insecurity, as opposed to confronting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The plan combines anti-corruption measures; economic policies; enhanced human rights protections; ethics reforms; public health, including treatment for drug use and exploration of drug legalization; transitional justice and amnesty for some criminals; and broader peace-building, to include traditional anti-crime measures such as prison reform and security sector reform, plus a new law enforcement force, the National Guard. - Various elements of his announced new security strategy-such as the formation of the National Guard - remain questionable and unclear and are unlikely to reduce violence quickly. - AMLO's proffered security strategy will likely create friction with the United States. Jointly countering fentanyl smuggling, however, could provide one venue of U.S.- Mexico cooperation. Corruption and Mexico's justice system - Combatting corruption is a foundational element of AMLO's security policy, and his administration has adopted a wide set of anti-corruption measures, including highly controversial and questionable ones. - However, AMLO has yet to appoint a dedicated anti-corruption prosecutor, make appointments to the National Anti-Corruption System, and support the 2016 National Anti-Corruption System reform. - AMLO has not broken with politically powerful and immensely corrupt unions, proposing instead to reverse reforms and lay off 70 percent of non-unionized federal workers. - It remains unclear whether AMLO will empower Mexico's civil society-crucial for reducing corruption-or continually define it as his antagonist. - AMLO's administration has not yet focused sufficiently on implementing the judicial reform by properly implementing the new prosecutorial system. - The administration has emphasized minimizing salary differences between public ministries, federal judges, prosecutors, and police officials. The weakness of prosecutors and their lack of cooperation with law enforcement and judges have been key stumbling blocks, keeping prosecution rates abysmally low. However, minimizing salary differences is inadequate. - Deleteriously, AMLO has refused to allow the independent selection of an autonomous attorney general. Focus on brutal crimes instead of drug trafficking groups and rejection of high-value targeting - The AMLO administration suspended focus on DTOs, drug trafficking, and high-value targeting of DTO leaders. Instead, it prioritizes "brutal crimes." But that strategy ignores the fact that key perpetrators of homicides, extortion, and robberies are DTOs. - Large law enforcement deployments to Tijuana and efforts to combat fuel theft have been interpreted by DTOs as direct confrontation. Instead, AMLO should prioritize targeting the most violent criminal groups, while deterring new outbreaks of violence. - The target should be the middle operational layer of a criminal group, seeking to disable the vast majority of the middle layer in one sweep, in order to reduce the group's regeneration capacity. - The Mexican government remains challenged in implementing such a policy by the continual lack of strategic and tactical intelligence in an ever more fragmented, mult-ipolar, and opaque criminal market, and by the continual corruption of Mexico's law enforcement apparatus. The National Guard -- - AMLO has not stopped using the Mexican military for domestic law enforcement. However, he has created a new structure combining military forces with Federal Police forces-The National Guard. - To be completed in three years, the National Guard is to be 150,000-strong. Sent initially to 17 areas with high homicide rates, the first contingent of 50,000 is to start functioning by April 2019. The head of the National Guard is a civilian, but much of the leadership is military.... Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190325_mexico_anti-crime.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190325_mexico_anti-crime.pdf Shelf Number: 155191 Keywords: Criminal Justice PolicyCriminal Justice SystemDrug TraffickingHomicidesNational SecurityPolitical CorruptionPublic SafetySecurity ForcesViolent Crimes |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Future Technology Trends in Security Summary: This paper highlights emerging trends and possible threats which government and the private sector should consider in order to inform future policy and promote more meaningful engagement between national security teams and innovation leads. The production of this paper involved consultation of many different subject matter experts across the defence and security domain. Details: London: Author, 2019. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786244/HO_OSCT_Future_Tech_Trends_Final_Updated_13Mar19.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786244/HO_OSCT_Future_Tech_Trends_Final_Updated_13Mar19.pdf Shelf Number: 155427 Keywords: Crime Prevention National SecuritySecurity Technology |
Author: Blanchard, Daphne N. Title: .Immigration and National Security: An Empirical Assessment of Central American Immigration and Violent Crime in the United States Summary: Executive Summary - The arrival of the October 2018 Central American caravan became a flashpoint in the immigration debate between human rights and national security. Thousands of migrants traveled in a caravan from Central America's Northern Triangle to the United States in October of 2018. President Trump called on Mexico to stop the influx, sent troops to the U.S.-Mexican border, and threatened to cut aid to the Central American country. While several hundred returned on Honduran-sponsored busses and roughly 2,000 people applied for asylum in southern Mexico, the group totaled 6,500 migrants when they arrived at the wall lining the San Ysidro-Tijuana border. Conflicts between the migrants, Mexican police, citizens of Tijuana and U.S. protesters made national headlines. Meanwhile, international aid groups offered makeshift housing, basic necessities, and legal representation for the asylum seekers. Immigration was central to the November mid-term election debates. - Central American immigration has risen significantly over the last few decades. Presently 3.4 million people born in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are living in the United States, more than double the estimated 1.5 million people in 2000, with half of them undocumented. In the time period between 2011 and 2017, the number of Northern Triangle immigrants rose approximately 400,000 which indicated a growth of 0.1 percent of the foreign-born population. The number of Northern Triangle migrant arrivals nearly quadrupled in 2014, with the arrival of approximately 131,000 migrants. El Salvador is the largest sending country from the region, with 1.4 million immigrants in the United States, a 112- fold increase since 1970. Guatemala is second with 815,000, followed by Honduras with 623,000. - The number of unaccompanied minors (also known as UACs) crossing the U.S.- Mexico border has dramatically increased since 2008. Between 2008 and the first eight months of 2014, the number of unaccompanied minors that crossed the U.S. southern border each year jumped from about 8,000 to 52,000, prompting the U.S. Congress to request further research and a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. The year 2014 was dubbed the Central America migration crisis due to the 90 percent increase in UACs between 2013 and 2014. The composition of the recent caravans that arrived in April and October of 2018 suggest that child and family migration from the Northern Triangle is an enduring phenomenon. - The root causes of the flows are pervasive violence and systematic persecution in the Northern Triangle region. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are consistently ranked among the world's most violent countries not at war due to their exceptionally high rates of homicide, extortion, gang proliferation, narcotics trafficking, weak rule of law, and official corruption. Many migrants reported fleeing systematic persecution from authorities, pervasive violence from organized criminal organizations, and forced gang recruitment. - Northern Triangle migrants make up less than one percent of the U.S. population. To put the increases in immigrant population in perspective and understand the scope of Central American migration, it is important to note that in 2017 the Northern Triangle subset of immigrants constitute 0.9% of the share of overall population, of which by far the largest percentage is attributed to those with El Salvadoran origins. Asian foreign-born are the most prevalent with 4.3 percent of the share, which consists of Eastern, South Central, and South Eastern Asian immigrants. Those born in Mexico are second with 3.4 percent; while European and African foreign-born make up 1.2 and 0.7 percent respectively. - Public anxiety over Central American migrants stalls immigration reform. The tension at the U.S.-Mexico border due to Central American asylum seekers has reached a fever pitch, polarizing views on how to deal with ever increasing immigration. Although seven percent of Northern Triangle refugees were granted asylum the year after the 2014 surge in migration, compared to 24 percent of refugees from China, the continual flow of Central American migrants to the United States' southern border elicits anxiety, protests, and much public debate. As rhetoric from high-level politicians and news media make connections between violent crime and immigration, political parties' stances on immigration become more divergent -- leading to the inability to agree on comprehensive immigration reform. The difference in opinion between Democrats and Republicans has grown over time with 42 percent of Republicans, compared to 84 percent of Democrats, saying that immigrants strengthen the country, the largest partisan gap on openness to immigrants since 1994. Democrats triple the share of Republicans with the opinion that the nation has a responsibility to care for refugees. - The internet and social media have heightened the risk of mass manipulation and emotional decision-making in immigration policy. Although the Trump administration and news outlets of today are not the first to make a public connection between crime and immigration - the debate has been ongoing for decades - changes in media technology have exacerbated the issue. The internet and social media platforms have significantly increased the scope and reach of consumers at hyper speed without third-party filtering, fact-checking, or editorial judgement to add context to complex issues. This is evident in a Republican-sponsored political commercial that connected an undocumented Mexican cop-killer with the tagline: "Stop the caravan. Vote Republican." Although widely rejected by major television and news outlets on both sides of the aisle for being misleading, the ad was seen approximately 6.5 million times while featured atop Trump's Twitter page. Studies have shown how elite discourse shapes mass opinion and action on immigration policy without necessarily tying the rhetoric to empirical data of the actual threat posed by the group. - Studies show that as immigration levels have risen in the United States, overall violent crime rates have reduced. The relationship between immigration and crime in the United States has been studied at length by scholars whose findings convey a similar conclusion: that immigration does not increase crime and violence, in fact, in the first generation it seems to reduce it. Since 1970 to today, the share and number of immigrants in the United States have increased rapidly while violent crime has been trending in the opposite direction to a level below what it was in 1980. Even as the U.S. undocumented population doubled to 12 million between 1994 and 2005, the violent crime rate in the United States declined 34.2 percent. In addition, cities with large immigrant populations such as Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Miami also experienced declining crime rates during that period. - Evidence does not support the notion that increases in Central American immigrant populations lead to increases in violent crime rates. Although Northern Triangle immigration has surged over the past several years, the evidence does not support the claim that they are posing a U.S. national security threat. Not only did overall U.S. violent crime rates descend as Central American migration share rose; but the influx of these foreigners in 27 metro areas showed no correlation when compared to the violent crime rate changes of each one during 2012 to 2017. When compared to homicide rate changes, there is no correlation between the changes in the immigrant population from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; in fact, the vast majority of cases demonstrate a reduction in crime. Not one of the 27 metros with high concentration of immigrants from that region is within the top ten of the most violent metros in the United States. The violence that Northern Triangle migrants are fleeing is not translating into more violence in American communities, as the public discourse seems to suggest. The Central American migration threat has been hyper-inflated in scope and potential for insecurity. - The scope of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang is narrow by comparison. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), approximately ten thousand MS-13 members inhabit the United States, amounting to 0.3 percent of the overall U.S. population. By comparison, there are approximately 1.4 million gang members living in the United States that make up more than 33,000 gangs. Of the 45,400 UACs apprehended at the border in the five-year period of 2012 and 2017, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) apprehended 159 UACs with confirmed or suspected gang affiliations, 56 of which were suspected or confirmed to be affiliated with MS-13. The Cato Institute reports that 0.1 percent of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol arrests were MS-13 gang members at the border midyear in 2018, similar to the statistics from prior years. - The brutality of MS-13 has the potential to disrupt neighborhoods, but not the United States as a whole. The threat of the MS-13 gang is far smaller in scope and reach than high-profile dialogue suggests, and it is given disproportionate attention in the public discourse considering the levels of crime. Of the 1.2 million violent crime offenses committed in the United States between 2012 and 2017, 345 were committed by members of the MS-13 gang. Although spread throughout cities in the United States and a legitimate concern for the communities which they inhabit, the members of this murderous gang do not demonstrate an ability to disrupt the stability and security of the entire nation and show no sign of expansion. Containing the threat of this violent criminal organization is best left to local authorities with local solutions. This research does not advocate ceasing to address the root causes of MS-13 criminal activity, only to keep the risk in perspective to reduce the negative consequences of fear-based decision-making. - The conflating of MS-13 with all immigrants in public discourse is unfounded and problematic. Connecting all immigrants with the violent acts of the few stalls progress on immigration reform, influences public opinion and immigration policy decisions without data to support the level of threat, creates an atmosphere of conflict surrounding those requesting asylum and settling in American neighborhoods, and is counterproductive to keeping Americans safe. Anxiety-inducing messaging from elite levels slows productive, compromise-driven dialogue that is necessary for immigration reform and effective allocation of finite resources. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2019. 40p. Source: Internet Resource:JUSTICE IN MEXICO WORKING PAPER SERIES Volume 16, Number 1: Accessed May 9, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BLANCHARD_Immigration-and-National-Security.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BLANCHARD_Immigration-and-National-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 155705 Keywords: Asylum SeekersGang ViolenceImmigrants and CrimeImmigration and CrimeImmigration PolicyMS-13 - Mara SalvatruchaNational SecurityNorthern TriangleSocial MediaUnaccompanied MinorsUndocumented MigrantsViolent Crime |